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Abstract
This paper undertakes a Bayesian analysis of optimal monetary policy for the
U.K. We estimate a suite of monetary-policy models that include both forward-
and backward-looking representations as well as large- and small-scale mod-
els. We ﬁnd an optimal simple Taylor-type rule that accounts for both model
and parameter uncertainty. For the most part, backward-looking models are
highly fault tolerant with respect to policies optimized for forward-looking rep-
resentations, while forward-looking models have low fault tolerance with re-
spect to policies optimized for backward-looking representations. In addition,
backward-looking models often have lower posterior probabilities than forward-
looking models. Bayesian policies therefore have characteristics suitable for
inﬂation and output stabilization in forward-looking models.
1 Introduction
Central bankers frequently emphasize the importance of uncertainty in shaping
monetary policy (e.g., see Greenspan 2004 and M. King 2004). Uncertainty takes
many forms. The central bank must act in anticipation of future conditions, which
are aﬀected by shocks that are currently unknown. In addition, because economists
have not formed a consensus about the best way to model the monetary transmission
∗The opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of
England or members of the Monetary Policy Committee.
†New York University. Email: tim.cogley@nyu.edu
‡Bank of England. Email: bianca.depaoli@bankofengland.co.uk.
§New York University. Email: cm1518@nyu.edu.
¶Bank of England. Email: kalin.nikolov@bankofengland.co.uk.
kBank of England. Email: tony.yates@bankofengland.co.uk.
1mechanism, policy makers must also contemplate alternative theories with distinctive
operating characteristics. Finally, even economists who agree on a modeling strat-
egy sometimes disagree about the values of key parameters. Central bankers must
therefore also confront parameter uncertainty within macroeconomic models.
A natural way to address these issues is to regard monetary policy as a Bayesian
decision problem. As noted by Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003), a Bayesian approach
is promising because it seamlessly integrates econometrics and decision theory. Thus,
we can use Bayesian econometric methods to assess various sources of uncertainty
and incorporate the results as an input to a decision problem.
Our aim in this paper is to consider how monetary policy should be conducted in
the face of multiple sources of uncertainty, including model and parameter uncertainty
as well as uncertainty about future shocks. We apply Bayesian methods root and
branch to a suite of macroeconomic models estimated on U.K. data, and we use the
results to devise a simple, optimal monetary-policy rule.
1.1 The method in more detail
Just to be clear, we take two shortcuts relative to a complete Bayesian implementa-
tion. First, we neglect experimentation. Under model and/or parameter uncertainty,
a Bayesian policy maker has an incentive to vary the policy instrument in order to gen-
erate information about unknown parameters and model probabilities. In the context
of monetary policy, however, a number of recent studies suggest that experimental
motives are weak and that ‘adaptive optimal policies’ (in the language of Svensson
and Williams 2008a) well approximate fully-optimal, experimental policies.1 Because
of that, and also because many central bankers are averse to experimentation, our
goal is to formulate an optimal non-experimental rule.
We also restrict attention to a simple rule, i.e. one involving a relatively small
number of arguments as opposed to the complete state vector. This is for tractability
as well as for transparency. For a Bayesian decision problem with multiple models,
the fully-optimal decision rule would involve the complete state vector for all the
models under consideration. That would complicate our calculations a great deal.
Some economists also argue that simple rules constitute more useful communication
tools. For example, Woodford (1999) writes that “a simple feedback rule would make
it easy to describe the central bank’s likely future conduct with considerable precision,
and veriﬁcation by the private sector of whether such a rule is actually being followed
should be straightforward as well.” Thus, we restrict policy to follow Taylor-like rules.
With those simpliﬁcations in mind, our goal is to choose the parameters of a
Taylor rule to minimize expected posterior loss. Suppose φ represents the policy-
rule parameters and that li(φ,θi) represents expected loss conditional on a particular
1E.g., see Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2008); Cogley, Colacito, Hansen, and Sargent (2008);
and Svensson and Williams (2007a, 2007b, 2008a, and 2008b).
2model i and a calibration of its parameters θi. Typically li(φ,θi) is a discounted
quadratic loss function that evaluates uncertainty about future shocks. One common
approach in the literature is to choose φ to minimize li(φ,θi). This delivers a simple
optimal rule for a particular model and calibration, but it neglects parameter and
model uncertainty.
To incorporate parameter uncertainty within model i, we must ﬁrst assess how
much uncertainty there is. This can be done by simulating the model’s posterior
distribution, p(θi|Y,Mi),w h e r eMi indexes model i, and Y represents current and
past data on variables relevant for that model. Methods for Bayesian estimation of
DSGE models were pioneered by Schorfheide (2000) and Smets and Wouters (2003)
and are reviewed by An and Schorfheide (2007). If model i were the only model under
consideration, expected loss would be
li(φ)=
Z
li(φ,θi)p(θi|Y,Mi)dθi. (1)
This integral might seem daunting, but it can be approximated by averaging across
draws from the posterior simulation. Assuming evenly weighted draws from the
posterior, expected loss is
li(φ) ≈ N
−1 PN
j=1 li(φ,θij), (2)
where N represents the number of Monte Carlo draws and θij is the jth draw for
model i. A policy rule robust to parameter uncertainty within model i can be found
by choosing φ to minimize li(φ).
This is a step in the right direction, but it still neglects model uncertainty. To
incorporate multiple models, we attach probabilities to each and weigh their impli-
cations in accordance with those probabilities. Posterior model probabilities depend
on prior beliefs and on their ﬁt to the data. Suppose that p(Mi) is the policy-makers
prior probability on model i,t h a tp(θi|Mi) summarizes his prior beliefs about the
parameters of that model, and that p(Y |θi,M i) is the model’s likelihood function.2
According to Bayes’ theorem, the posterior model probability is
p(Mi|Y ) ∝ p(Y |Mi)p(Mi), (3)
where
p(Y |Mi)=
Z
p(Y |θi,M i)p(θi|Mi)dθi (4)
is the marginal likelihood or marginal data density. The latter can also be approxi-
mated numerically using output of the posterior simulation; see An and Schorfheide
2For simplicity, we assume that Y is common across models, but that is unnecessary. A technical
appendix posted online at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~tc60 describes the more realistic case in
which the list of variables diﬀe r sa c r o s sm o d e l .
3for details. To account for model uncertainty, we average li(φ) across models using
posterior model probabilities as weights,
l(φ)=
Xm
i=1 li(φ)p(Mi|Y ). (5)
A policy rule robust to both model and parameter uncertainty can be found by
choosing φ to minimize l(φ).
This decision problem might seem complicated, but because the problem is mod-
ular it can be solved numerically without much trouble. The main simpliﬁcation
follows from the fact that the econometrics can be done separately for each model
and also separately from the decision problem.
1.2 Sketch of previous literature
Our work follows and builds on many previous contributions. As mentioned above,
one is the body of work estimating dynamic general equilibrium models using Bayesian
methods. This literature has exploded in recent years and includes numerous appli-
cations to monetary policy.
A second closely-related literature concerns forecast model averaging. This re-
search was initiated by Bates and Granger (1969) and is now widely regarded as
representing best practice in forecasting. Amongst others, recent contributions to the
frequentist literature include Clements and Hendry (1998, 2002) and Newbold and
Harvey (2002), while examples of Bayesian forecast averaging include Diebold and
Pauly (1990), Jacobson and Karlsson (2004), and Kapetanios, Labhard, and Price
(2008). Our work is distinct from this in that we are interested not only in forecast-
ing but also in solving a decision problem. Of course, forecasting is an input to our
decision problem, but it is not an end in itself. For that reason, we concern ourselves
with structural macroeconomic models.
Another important precursor is Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003 and 2007). They
also emphasize the importance of accounting for model and parameter uncertainty in
policy design, and they describe a variety of Bayesian and frequentist approaches for
integrating econometrics and policy design. Our framework follows directly from one
of their proposals.3 They also investigate the robustness of Taylor rules within a class
of backward-looking models a la Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). Cogley and Sargent
(2005a) apply the ideas of Brock, et al. to investigate how model uncertainty aﬀected
monetary policy during the Great Inﬂation. For tractability, Cogley and Sargent
adopt two shortcuts, restricting the model set to a trio of very simple Phillips-curve
models and neglecting parameter uncertainty within each model. In our application,
we expand the model set to include forward-looking new Keynesian models, and we
3Among other things, they also discuss frequentist and Waldean approaches to econometrics as
well as models in which the decision maker is averse to ambiguity.
4explicitly account for parameter uncertainty. Cogley and Aargent’s (2005a) work is
a positive exercise: our paper follows Brock et al (2003,2007) and concentrates on
normative questions.
Other routes to robustness include those of McCallum (1988) and Hansen and
Sargent (2008). McCallum pioneered an informal version of model averaging, depre-
cating policy rules optimized with respect to a single model and advocating rules that
work well across a spectrum of models. Much of Taylor’s (1999) volume on monetary-
policy rules can be read as an application of McCallum’s ideas. Recent applications
include Levin and Williams (2003), Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003), and Levin,
Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005).4 We embrace McCallum’s approach and
extend it by providing Bayesian underpinnings. We want to forge a tighter link be-
tween this literature and the literature on Bayesian estimation of DSGE models. Our
hope is that a more formal assessment of uncertainties will pay oﬀ in policy design.
Hansen and Sargent (2008) develop yet another approach to model uncertainty.
They specify a single, explicit benchmark model, surround it with an uncount-
able cloud of alternative models whose entropy relative to the benchmark model
is bounded, and ﬁnd an optimal rule by solving a minimax problem over that set of
models. In contrast, we work with a small number of explicit models and assume
that policy makers entertain no other possibilities. Our approach no doubt under-
states the true degree of model uncertainty by excluding a priori a large number of
potential alternatives. Despite this shortcoming, we think the Bayesian approach is
useful because it is more explicit about the relative probabilities of models within the
suite.5
1.3 Outline
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our suite of models, em-
phasizing their distinctive characteristics and features of the posterior that are most
salient for monetary policy. Section 3 reports posterior model weights, and section
4 presents our main results. There we describe an optimal Taylor rule and illustrate
how it works in the various submodels.
2 The Suite of Models
W ef o c u so nm o d e l st h a tc o m m a n ds o m ea t t e n t i o ni nt h em o n e t a r y - p o l i c yl i t e r a -
ture. Within that class, our intention is to span a variety of approaches to modelling
4Levin and Williams (2003) cite Patrick Minford as drawing the analogy with a committee of
decision makers each with their own model of the inﬂation process, who would opt for a policy rule
provided it does not perform disastrously in any of the individual members’ models.
5Sometimes the two approaches are distinguished by saying that one explores structured model
uncertainty and the other unstructured uncertainty.
5inﬂation dynamics. For instance, we compare microfounded and non-microfounded
models, RE vs. non RE models, and small models that oﬀer parsimony at the expense
of a rich account of macrodynamics vs. larger models that ﬁt better but involve many
more parameters.
Our suite currently comprises four models, all of which are estimated using UK
quarterly time series on nominal interest rates, inﬂation and real GDP growth. As
the UK has undergone numerous monetary regime shifts during the post-war period,
we only use data from the inﬂation-targeting period, Q1 1993 - Q3 2006. Our data
deﬁnitions are as follows. For the nominal interest rate we use the Bank of England’s
policy rate (source: Bank of England). For inﬂation we use the quarterly change in
the logarithm of the GDP deﬂator (source: Oﬃce of National Statistics). For output
growth we use the quarterly change in real GDP at market prices (source: Oﬃce of
National Statistics). All variables are demeaned prior to estimation.
In what follows, we brieﬂy describe the salient features of each model. A complete
presentation can be found in the appendices.
2.1 A traditional backward-looking Keynesian model
We begin with a traditional, backward-looking Keynesian model in the spirit of
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). We include this model for two reasons. As Rude-
busch and Svensson emphasize, traditional Keynesian models represent the thinking
of many central bankers. Thus, at least one member of a monetary policy committee
is likely to place positive probability on a model in this class.
In addition, in studies of robust monetary policy for the U.S., one of the main
challenges has been ﬁnding a rule that works well both for forward- and backward-
looking models. When estimated with U.S. data, backward-looking models typically
imply a high degree of intrinsic inﬂation persistence. In contrast, in forward-looking
models, decision rules and the equilibrium law of motion adapt to the policy rule.
Because inﬂation persistence is intrinsic in backward-looking models and endogenous
in forward-looking models, rules that succeed in stabilizing inﬂation in the latter of-
ten result in excessive output variability in the former, while gradualist rules well
adapted to a backward-looking environment frequently permit more inﬂation vari-
abity in forward-looking models than one might like. Finding a rule well adapted
to both environments can be challenging. Furthermore, this can happen even when
the probability weight on backward-looking models is small. For example, in a study
of the Great Inﬂation, Cogley and Sargent (2005) report that traditional Keynesian
models dominate Bayesian policy despite having probability weights close to zero.6
Our version of the Rudebusch-Svensson model is detailed in appendix A, and the
priors and posteriors are listed in tables A1-A6. The model consists of three equations
6This can happen when the period loss function is unbounded.
6- a backward-looking Phillips curve, a backward-looking IS curve, and a Taylor rule
for monetary policy. Since the model is entirely backward-looking, inﬂation and
output persistence are hard-wired into the structural equations, and expectations of
future policy have no eﬀect on current outcomes.
The model is estimated for three sets of priors. Our benchmark prior (table
A1) is centered on Rudebusch and Svensson’s original estimates7 but has large prior
variances, reﬂecting the considerable degree of uncertainty about the relevance of
U.S. estimates for models of the U.K. At the prior mode, the Phillips and IS curves
encode a high degree of intrinsic inﬂation and output persistence, but because the
prior variances are large the data remain inﬂuential.
Indeed, the posterior diﬀers from the prior in two respects that are important for
monetary policy (see table A4). First, inﬂation and output turn out to be considerably
less persistent than under the prior. In this respect, our estimates conﬁrm studies
such as Benati (2008) and Levin and Piger (2006), who also report a marked decline in
inﬂation persistence during the Great Moderation. Second, the slope of the IS curve
with respect to the real interest rate is smaller than under the prior, and the lower
end of a 95 percent credible set is only slightly above zero. If this coeﬃcient were
equal to zero, the central bank would not be able to inﬂuence output or inﬂation via
an interest-rate rule, and realizations of output and inﬂation would be independent
of policy-rule parameters.
The ﬁnding that there is less instrinsic persistence in U.K. data for the inﬂation-
targeting period than in Rudebusch and Svensson’s sample is important for policy
design. To assess the robustness of this ﬁnding, we re-estimate the model using two
alternative priors: (1) a tighter prior based on the original Rudebusch-Svensson es-
timates (table A2) and (2) a tighter prior centred on simple AR(1) speciﬁcations
involving a low degree of inﬂation and output persistence (table A3). The ﬁrst alter-
native represents an attempt to force high intrinsic persistence onto the data. Some-
what to our surprise, we found that the estimates are broadly similar to those for the
benchmark prior (see table A5). Although this prior is tighter than the benchmark,
it is not so tight as to dominate the likelihood function, and since the tight RS prior
is centered far from the maximum likelihood estimate the data remain inﬂuential.
Thus, even when we try, we struggle to force high intrinsic persistence onto the data.
The second alternative prior explores robustness in a diﬀerent direction. An al-
ternative interpretation of the data is that high inﬂation persistence arises not from
variation within a stable monetary regime, but rather from variation across policy
regimes. For instance, Benati (2008), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), and Ireland (2007)
a r g u et h a ts h i f t si nt a r g e ti n ﬂa t i o na c c o u n tf o rm u c ho ft h ep e r s i s t e n c ei ni n ﬂation.
Thus, as another robustness check, we re-estimate the model with an informative
prior involving low degrees of intrinsic persistence. Once again, we ﬁnd that model’s
7This is permissable because they use data for the U.S., and we study data for the U.K.
7characteristics are qualitatively robust to changes in the prior (see table A6).
The alternative priors will matter for posterior model probabilities. Especially
important is the diﬀerence between our baseline and the low-persistence prior. The
consequences of this modeling choice for optimal policy are discussed below.
2.2 A medium-scale dynamic new Keynesian model
The second member of our suite is a medium-scale new Keynesian model simi-
lar to that of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). This model features a variety of real and nominal rigidities, including habit
persistence, sticky wages, sticky prices, variable capital utilisation, and investment-
adjustment costs. The Smets-Wouters model ﬁt sU Sa n dE u r oA r e ad a t ai naw a y
that is competitive to a BVAR, and it has become a workhorse for monetary-policy
analysis.
Relative to their speciﬁc a t i o n ,w es t r e a m l i n et h em o d e lt om a k ei tm o r ep a r s i m o -
nious. Nevertheless, for a DSGE model it is still heavily parameterized. For Bayesian
model averaging, a dense parameterization is both an advantage and a disadvantage.
Introducing a rich variety of shocks and frictions improves the model’s ﬁt, but the
additional parameters are penalized when weighing models. One of our objectives is
t oe x p l o r et h i st r a d e o ﬀ.
Our version of the Smets-Wouters model is described in detail in appendix B,
and the prior and posterior are summarized in tables A7 and A8, respectively. Two
features of the posterior are important for policy design. First, in a number of di-
mensions, the posterior closely resembles the prior. Amongst others, parameters
governing the degree of nominal rigidity are weakly identiﬁed. This identiﬁcation
problem arises because of the large size of the SW model combined with our limited
number of data series and short sample. Thus, along several dimensions, parameter
values are eﬀectively set via the priors. The large number of parameters and the
fact that some are weakly identiﬁed will count against the model when calculating
posterior model probabilities.
One exception to this general result concerns the degree of price indexation, which
we are able to estimate precisely, in the sense that the mode of the posterior turns
out to be considerably lower than in the prior. At the posterior mode, the price-
indexation parameter is 0.162. In contrast, Christiano, et al. (2005) calibrate their
price-indexation parameter at unity. Thus, as for the RS model, our version of the
SW model involves substantially less intrinsic inﬂation persistence than in versions
for the US.
82.3 A small-scale new Keynesian model with credit frictions
Since the optimal tradeoﬀ between ﬁt and parsimony is an open question, we also
study a small-scale dynamic new Keynesian model that ﬁts fewer features of the data
but which is more parsimonious. Among many candidates, we chose a model similar
to that of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), which builds a ﬁnancial accelerator
into an otherwise standard new Keynesian model. The BGG model is much smaller
in scale than the Smets-Wouters model, and we include it in the suite not only
because we want to compare small- and medium-scale models but also because we
are interested in the ﬁnancial accelerator.
This model is presented in appendix C, and its prior and posterior are recorded in
tables A9 and A10. In many ways, the estimates agree with those for the SW model.
They diﬀer, however, in one important respect, viz. that nominal prices are consider-
ably more ﬂexible in the BGG model than in the SW model. At the posterior mode,
the estimates imply that prices are re-optimized once every 1.5 quarters. Because
there is so little nominal rigidity, inﬂation is volatile but not persistent. This feature
of the BGG model will matter later when designing a Bayesian policy.
2.4 A small-open-economy model
Last but not least, for the UK we feel that the suite should include an open-
economy model in order to take into account international dimensions of monetary
policy. Accordingly, we consider a small-open-economy model in the style of Gali and
Monacelli (2005). The model assumes that home price setting follows a Calvo-type
contract and features complete pass-through, as prices are set in the producer’s cur-
rency. Moreover, even though the law of one price holds, deviations from purchasing
power parity arise from the existence of home bias in consumption. Finally, markets
are complete, and domestic and foreign agents optimally share risk.
The model is presented in appendix D, with the prior and posterior shown in
tables A11 and A12, respectively. Concentrating on features that are important for
monetary policy, the estimates imply a degree of price ﬂexibility in between those
found for the BGG and SW models. Unlike the other models, the model implies that
the terms of trade enter both the IS and Phillips curves. Because no international
data are used for estimation, however, it is diﬃcult to obtain sharp estimates of the
parameters governing these channels. This handicaps the model in comparison with
the others.
3 Posterior model probabilities
For each model, we estimate the marginal data density using Geweke’s (1999)
modiﬁed harmonic-mean estimator. Then we combine marginal data densities with
9prior model probabilities to compute posterior model probabilities. In every case, we
assume equal prior odds on the four models, as shown in table 1. Posterior model
probabilities are reported in table 2.
Table 1: Prior model probabilities
Model RS1 RS2 RS3
Rudebusch-Svensson 1/4 1/4 1/4
Smets-Wouters 1/4 1/4 1/4
BGG 1/4 1/4 1/4
SOE 1/4 1/4 1/4
Table 2: Posterior model probabilities
Model RS1 RS2 RS3
Rudebusch-Svensson 0.0204 0.0000 0.8010
Smets-Wouters 0.8008 0.8175 0.1627
BGG 0.1757 0.1793 0.0357
SOE 0.0031 0.0033 0.0006
Note: RS1 refers to the baseline prior, RS2 to the prior tightly centered on Rudebusch and
Svensson’s estimates, and RS3 to the prior involving weak persistence.
Three scenarios are considered, corresponding to the three priors on the Rudebusch-
Svensson model. The ﬁrst column records the outcome for our baseline RS prior. Re-
call that the benchmark prior has its mode at the original RS estimates but is fairly
loose. For this scenario, the SW model is the most probable with a weight of over
80%, the BGG model comes second with a weight of 17.6%, the Rudebusch-Svensson
model comes third with a weight of 2.0%, while the weight on the SOE model is less
than 1%. Thus, at least in this comparison, ﬁt seems to trump parsimony, as the
densely parameterized SW model is assigned a probability 4 times that of the more
parsimonoius BGG model. The BGG model weight is nontrivial, however.
Alas, the other two models are assigned low probability weights. Two factors
explain the low weight on the SOE model. One is that the model assumes a purely-
forward Phillips curve and abstracts from inﬂation indexation. Although the esti-
mated degree of indexation in the SW and BGG models is not large, it is not zero,
and a little bit of indexation seems to help ﬁt the data. In addition, although the
structural model is of an open economy, it resembles a closed economy with: (A) a
diﬀerent deﬁnition for potential output that includes foreign output; and (B) an un-
observed endogenous variable (namely, the exchange rate) driving diﬀerences between
the consumer and producer prices. Neither feature is well captured in our estimation
10because no data on exchange rates or foreign variables are used. For model aver-
aging, the models must be conditioned on the same variables, and since the others
have nothing to say about exchange rates or foreign variables, we cannot condition
on these variables.
Turning to the Rudenbusch-Svensson model, there are two reasons why it has a
low posterior probability. One is that the posterior mean for the U.K. is very diﬀerent
from the prior, which is based on estimates for the U.S. As noted above, the U.S.
estimates imply high instrinsic persistence, while those for the U.K. imply very little
persistence. The marginal data density is the prior expectation of the likelihood
function, and it tends to be low when the maximum likelihood estimate is far from
the prior mode. A second reason is that the baseline RS prior is loose. We adopted
a loose prior because the RS model is not microfounded; hence it was diﬃcult for us
to formulate an informative prior. A loose prior spreads probability mass throughout
the parameter space and can put a lot of weight on regions in which the likelihood is
small. Other things equal, that also reduces the prior expectation of the likelihood.
Thus, the baseline prior may put the RS model at a disadvantage in posterior
model comparisons. Since posterior model probabilities can be sensitive to the choice
of prior when the prior is weakly informative, we perform two sensitivity analyses on
the location and tightness of the RS prior.
Our ﬁrst sensitivity check involves tightenening the baseline RS prior, while still
centering it on Rudebusch and Svensson’s estimates. The estimates still suggest a
low degree of persistence despite the tight prior. However, the marginal data density
actually falls very sharply because the priors now are located even further from the
maximum likelihood estimate. The second column of Table 2 shows this very clearly,
as the weight on the RS model declines to zero in this case.
Our second sensitivity check involves using information from a growing literature
on the Great Moderation which suggests that the persistence of all economic series
in the US has declined dramatically over the past 25 years. This would suggest
that the prior degree of persistence should be considerably lower compared to what
Rudebusch and Svensson originally estimated. Thus, we specify a tight prior centred
on a very low degree of persistence for output and inﬂation. Again, this change of
prior matters more for the marginal data density than for the posterior mean of the
parameters. Now prior and likelihood agree to a much greater extent and, as the
ﬁnal column of Table 2 shows, the posterior probability of the Rudebusch-Svensson
model jumps dramatically to over 80%, making it the likeliest model in our suite.
The posterior probabilities of the other models correspondingly fall: Smets-Wouters
now has a probability of 16.3%, BGG has a probability of 3.6%, while the probability
of SOE model falls below 0.1%.
The next section devises Bayesian policy rules for each scenario shown in table 2.
114 The Policy Problem
To implement our method, we must specify the function l which maps the values
that a model generates for a set of variables, under a given policy rule, into losses, or
welfare. Strictly speaking, we should use the welfare of households in each model. So
for each model and parameterization there would be a diﬀerent l function. However,
we will, at least initially, abstract from this step, and choose one that we know from
previous work8 will not be too bad an approximation to the ‘microfounded’ loss
function.
4.1 The Period Loss Function
For a given policy φ,a n dag i v e nm o d e lj with parameterization θjk,t h ep e r i o d
loss function is
lj(φ,θjk)=E [var(4πt)+λyvar(yt − y
∗
t)+λivar(4it)|φ,θjk]. (6)
The loss function depends on the unconditional variance of annualised inﬂation, the
output gap and the annualised nominal interest rate, where λy =1is the relative
weight on the output gap while λi =0 .1 i st h ew e i g h to nn o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t e
variability.
The output gap used in computing the loss function diﬀers between the models.
In the micro-founded models SW, BGG and SOE, a model consistent measure of
‘natural output’ y∗
t can be computed and this is what we use in order to compute the
output gap yt − y∗
t. In the RS model, the concept of ‘natural output’ is undeﬁned
and therefore we use detrended output yt.
A small weight on interest-rate variability is included in order to avoid extreme
volatility of the policy rate. Woodford (2003) motivates such a term in the objective
function by appealing to the desirability of damping variation in the tax on the
liquidity services of money. He also argues that an interest-smoothing term helps
central banks avoid hitting the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
To ﬁnd the expected loss, we integrate across models and parameterizations, as de-
scribed in section (1.1). For particular parameter values, some policy settings generate
indeterminate equilibria in some of the models. In such cases, we set lj(φ,θjk)=∞,
thus ensuring that the Bayesian policy rule guarantees determinacy.
8An example is Amato and Laubach (2003) who note that the optimal criterion for monetary
poilcy is not much changed by varying inherent backward-lookingness in the inﬂation process deriving
from rule-of thumb behaviour on the part of price-setters.
124.2 Optimal simple rules
We choose the coeﬃcients on our simple rule
it = φiit−1 +( 1− φi)
¡
φππt + φyyt
¢
+ φdy (yt − yt−1) (7)
in order to minimise the loss function (5). Notice that the central bank responds
to detrended output yt instead of the model-consistent output gap. This is likely to
involve some welfare loss. However, responding to the output gap in a multiple-model
world involves considerable complications, and we leave this for future work. For now
we take the simple approach of picking a rule which only responds to detrended
output, output growth and price inﬂation.
We begin by examining optimal simple rules in each model. Then we study the
optimal policy in the suite as a whole under the assumption that each model has been
given its Bayesian weight. We also consider a scenario in which each model receives
an equal weight.
When numerically searching for the optimal coeﬃcients in individual models we
found loss functions to be rather ﬂat around the optimum. As a result, coeﬃcients
often moved a very long way without a signiﬁcant change in the value of the loss func-
tion. For this reason we imposed a limit of 100 on the long-run response coeﬃcients
to inﬂation and output.
4.2.1 Optimal simple rules in individual models
Tables 3 records the policy-rule parameters for optimal simple rules in each of
the individual models, and table 4 summarizes the volatility of inﬂation, output, and
nominal interest under those policies. The rules diﬀer in interesting ways.
Table 3: Optimal policy coeﬃcients in the individual models
Coeﬃcients SW BGG SOE RS1 RS2 RS3
Smoothing 0.99 0.03 0.61 0.06 0.81 0.05
Inﬂation 65.3 100.0 42.19 0.01 1.01 0.01
Output 7.71 -0.06 -0.20 0.03 0.08 0.05
Output Growth 1.71 -0.20 4.10 0.00 0.10 0.00
Loss 5.62 0.035 0.83 3.45 6.75 3.28
13Table 4: Volatility under Model-Speciﬁc Policies
Inﬂation Output Nominal Interest
SW 4.31 1.18 1.34
BGG 0.0002 0.003 0.30
SOE 0.20 1.05 2.64
RS1 3.33 0.10 0.17
RS2 6.17 0.27 3.19
RS3 3.14 0.12 0.17
Note: RS1 refers to the baseline prior, RS2 to the prior tightly centered on Rudebusch and
Svensson’s estimates, and RS3 to the prior involving weak persistence.
For the BGG model, the optimal policy approximates pure inﬂation tareting.
The BGG model has little price stickiness or price indexation and consequently, both
inﬂation and output-gap volatility can be reduced almost to zero by responding ag-
gressively to inﬂation deviations from target. The threat of an aggressive response
keeps the inﬂation gap close to zero, and since there are no cost-push shocks and
wages are ﬂexible, this also keeps the output gap close to zero. The inﬂation response
coeﬃcient hits the upper bound of 100. Increasing the inﬂation response further led
to very small additional reductions in expected loss, which is why we were happy
to cap the coeﬃcient at this level. The response coeﬃcients to output and interest-
smoothing parameters are close to zero.
In the Smets-Wouters model, the monetary-policy tradeoﬀ is more challenging
because there are large and persistent shocks to the markup and sticky wages as
well as sticky prices. Thus, even under the optimized rule, a substantial amount
of inﬂation and output variability remains. Nevertheless, the optimal rule calls for
aggressive long-run responses to inﬂa t i o na n do u t p u tb u tw i t ha ne x t r e m e l yh i g h
degree of interest rate smoothing (almost a unit root). This is similar to the optimal
simple rules which performed well in the paper by Levin, Wieland and Williams
(2003). Accordingly, they advocate ‘ﬁrst-diﬀerence’ rules, i.e. rules where the change
in the nominal interest rate is a linear function of inﬂation and the output gap.9
In terms of monetary-policy challenges, the SOE model lies between the BGG
and SW models. In this model, the central bank can simultaneously stabilize the
output gap and producer prices. The welfare loss cannot be driven to zero, however,
because the period loss function (6) depends on consumer price inﬂation — which
is also aﬀected by movements in international relative prices — and movements in
interest rates. Like the other forward-looking models, the optimal rule calls for a
high long-run coeﬃcient on inﬂation (φπ =4 1 ), with more interest smoothing than
in the SW model and less than in the BGG model. The response to output is also
9Orphanides and Williams (2007) report that ﬁrst-diﬀerence rules also perform well under learn-
ing.
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minimized welfare loss is signiﬁcantly lower than in the SW model but higher than
in the BGG model.
The Rudebusch and Svensson model variants were perhaps the biggest surprise
of all, featuring extremely weak responses to all endogenous variables. Under the
baseline prior and the prior which places most weight on low inﬂation and output
persistence, the optimal rule fails to satisfy the Taylor principle. Even when we
imposed a tight prior on high inﬂation and output persistence, the optimal rule
remains relatively unresponsive although it just satisﬁes the Taylor principle.
The reasons for this are simple. First of all, since the model is entirely backward-
looking, indeterminacy is not an issue. Secondly, the estimated persistence of both
inﬂation and output are low even in the case of a tight prior on Rudebusch and Svens-
son’s original estimates. This implies that shocks die out relatively quickly regardless
of the policy response. Finally, the slope of the IS curve is robustly estimated to be
very low. This implies that, due to the penalty on interest-rate variability, respond-
ing aggressively to shocks which policy will ﬁnd it hard to control anyway is not
worthwhile. Under priors 1 and 3, the central bank essentially ignores inﬂation and
output and tries to minimize nominal interest volatility. Those rules approximate a
pure nominal interest peg.
4.2.2 Fault tolerance of model-speciﬁco p t i m a lp o l i c i e s
Next, following McCallum (1988), we consider how the model-speciﬁco p t i m a l
rules perform in other models. The purpose is to develop intuition about pitfalls
central bankers face because of model uncertainty and about the nature of the policies
that are optimal across models.
The results are presented in table 5. Each column shows how loss increases as
we replace the optimal rule for that model with the optimal rule for another model.
A relative loss of unity implies that the alternative rule peforms just as well as the
model-speciﬁc optimal policy, and a large number indicates that the alternative rule
delivers a much inferior performance. We assign an inﬁnite loss whenever a policy
rule results in instability or indeterminacy. So, for example, the ﬁrst column shows
how the optimal rule for the Smets-Wouters model performs across the suite. The
rule delivers a slight deterioration relative to model-speciﬁc optimal rules in the SOE
model and the three variants of the RS model. Its relative performance is poor in the
BGG model, which dislikes the SW rule’s strong response to the output gap.
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SW BGG SOE RS1 RS2 RS3
SW 1 ∞ 5.37 ∞ 1.35 ∞
BGG 334 1 3.82 ∞ 3339 ∞
SOE 5.98 1.40 1 ∞ 50 ∞
RS1 2.77 ∞ 45 1 1.02 1.00
RS2 3.30 ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞
RS3 1.94 ∞ 44 1.00 1.02 1
Note: RS1 refers to the baseline prior, RS2 to the prior tightly centered on Rudebusch
and Svensson’s estimates, and RS3 to the prior involving weak persistence. We report an
inﬁnite loss (denoted by ∞) when the model is unstable or indeterminate.
The ﬁrst and most important lesson that emerges from this table is that rules
optimized for variants of the Rudebusch-Svensson model are dangerous for forward-
looking economies. The rules optimized for RS1 and RS3 fail to satisfy the Taylor
principle and result in indeterminacy in forward-looking models. The rule optimized
for RS2 satisﬁes the Taylor principle and delivers a unique solution in all models in
the suite, but since the long-run inﬂation response is only slighly above unity this
rule does badly in models with little nominal inertia (BGG and SOE). Such models
have the implication that a strong response to inﬂation can drive losses almost to
zero, and relative losses rise rapidly as the inﬂation response weakens. Thus, the
forward-looking models in our suite have low fault tolerance with respect to policies
devised for the backward-looking models. The BGG and SOE models are less fault
tolerant than the SW model.
A second important lesson is that inﬂation-only Taylor rules can be dangerous.
The BGG optimal policy, which responds little to variables other than inﬂation,
works well when there is little nominal inertia (BGG and SOE), but it works poorly
in the other models, generating explosive outcomes in the backward-looking models.
Somewhat to our surprise, the SW model also becomes unstable when subjected
to the BGG-optimal rule. The SW model has considerable nominal inertia, and
backward-looking indexation makes price and wage inﬂation partly pre-determined.
The SW-optimal policy calls for a high degree of interest-rate smoothing in order to
stabilise inﬂation and the output gap without excessive volatility in the short-term
interest rate. The highly inertial response to current conditions allows long real rates
to ﬂuctuate substantially while the short rate (which enters the loss function) remains
stable. In contrast, the BGG-optimal rule calls for an enormous short-run response
to price inﬂation with essentially no interest smoothing. This very strong response
to a partly predetermined variable makes outcomes unstable.
16A third lesson is that RS1 and RS3 have high fault tolerance as long as the policy
rule does not have an enormous short-run response coeﬃcient on inﬂation. Except
for the BGG-optimal rule, all the policies deliver acceptable performance in these
models. This follows from that fact that intrinsic persistence is weak, that the slope
of the IS curve is close to zero, and that the weight on nominal interest volatility is
small.
Finally, the SW-optimal policy performs reasonably well in all models. The rel-
ative loss in the BGG model is 334, but the absolute loss under the BGG-optimal
policy is small, and 334 times that small number comes to 11.7. This is approximately
twice the absolute loss in the SW model under the SW policy.
Table 6 below presents additional information on the behavior of the models under
alternative policies. Each cell contains three numbers - the standard deviations of
annualised inﬂation, the output gap and the annualised nominal interest rate. This
allows us to trace the exact sources of fault intolerance in the various models.
Table 6: Volatility in Model i (rows) Under a Policy Optimized for Model j (columns)
SW BGG SOE RS1 RS2 RS3
SW
4.31
1.18
1.34
—
3.45
13.1
136
—
4.57
2.93
0.77
—
BGG
11.09
0.03
0.96
0.0002
0.003
0.3
0.09
0.003
0.35
—
108
0.23
38.3
—
SOE
4.43
0.88
1.58
0.001
1.14
6.82
0.20
1.05
2.64
—
38.7
1.11
15.12
—
RS1
3.32
0.17
60.5
—
3.28
1.60
1507
3.33
0.10
0.17
3.32
0.10
1.051
3.33
0.10
0.17
RS2
5.90
1.13
153
— — —
6.17
0.27
3.19
—
RS3
3.14
0.19
30.3
—
3.17
2.36
1385
3.14
0.12
0.17
3.14
0.12
0.95
3.14
0.12
0.17
Note: The entries in each cell represent the standard deviation of inﬂation, output, and
nominal interest, respectively. Empty cells refer to indeterminate or explosive outcomes.
RS1 refers to the baseline prior, RS2 to the prior tightly centered on Rudebusch and Svens-
son’s estimates, and RS3 to the prior involving weak persistence.
17The ﬁrst three rows describe the performance of the three forward-looking models.
The SW model has high fault tolerance with respect to the SOE- and RS2-optimal
policies. Like the SW-optimal policy, the RS2-optimal rule also involves high interest
smoothing, but with weak responses to inﬂation and output. This results in lower
nominal interest volatility and only slightly higher inﬂation volatility, but output
volatility increases by a factor of 2.5. The SOE-optimal policy involves less interest
smoothing and a more aggressive short-term response to inﬂation. The more aggres-
sive short-term response to inﬂation reduces inﬂation volatility by about 20 percent,
but output volatility increases by a factor of 12 and there is an enormouse increase in
nominal interest volatility. This happens because the cost-push shocks and nominal
wage inertia makes inﬂation stabilisation much more costly in the SW model than in
the SOE model.
The BGG model has high fault tolerance with respect to the SOE-optimal policy
but low fault tolerance with respect to the SW and RS2 optimal rules. Because prices
are estimated to be almost ﬂexible in the BGG model, ﬂuctuations in detrended out-
put are eﬃcient and do not correspond to movements in the output gap (which is
approximately equal to zero at all times). Therefore an aggressive response to de-
trended output such as under the SW-optimal policy leads to enormous ﬂuctuation
in inﬂation. Equally, the BGG model behave poorly under with a weak long-run
inﬂation response such as the RS2-optimal policy because these policies fail to sta-
bilise inﬂation and also lead to volatile nominal interest rates. The BGG model
performs well under policies that respond strongly to inﬂation and weakly to output.
Among the other model-speciﬁc rules, the SOE-optimal policy comes closest to this
description.
The SOE behaves similarly (see the third row of the table). Prices are again
fairly ﬂexible and inﬂation has no intrinsic persistence. Consequently welfare under
the SOE model deteriorates either when a rule responds strongly to output (the
SW rule) or when it responds insuﬃciently to inﬂation (the RS2 rule). The model
performs well under the BGG-optimal policty, albeit with a substantial increase in
nominal interest volatility.
The last three rows of Table 6 describe the performance of the RS model variants
under alternative policies. RS1 and RS3 are highly fault tolerant. One remarkable
feature of these models is that, with the exception of the BGG-optimal rule, inﬂation
and output volatility is approximately invariant to changes in policy. The diﬀerence
in welfare under alternative policies is due almost entirely to changes interest rate
variability. For example, under the RS1- and RS3-optimal rules, nominal interest
volatility is 0.17. This increases to about 1 percent under the RS2-optimal policy,
but rises enormously under the SW or SOE-optimal rules. Other components of the
loss function hardly change. This demonstrates yet again what kinds of policies are
optimal in the RS model. Because the slope of the IS curve is small and inﬂation
has a little intrinsic persistence, policy cannot do much to stabilise the economy. Re-
18sponding aggressively carries little beneﬁt in terms of lower output gap and inﬂation
volatility but plenty of costs in terms of higher nominal interest rate variability.
4.2.3 Optimal simple rules under Bayesian model weights
Table 7 describe Bayesian policies for three versions of our suite. The ﬁrst column
shows the optimal simple rule formed by combining SW, BGG, SOE, and RS1. The
second and third columns retain the forward-looking models and replace RS1 with
RS2 and RS3, respectively. Within each suite, the models are weighed in accordance
with the posterior probabilities shown in table 2.
Table 7: Optimal policy coeﬃcients with Bayesian model weights
Coeﬃcients Bayes 1 Bayes 2 Bayes 3
Smoothing 0.97 0.97 0.51
Inﬂation 39.5 48.81 1.53
Output 4.60 4.92 0.07
Output growth 1.60 1.85 -0.01
Loss 5.59 5.42 4.09
Note: Bayes 1, 2, and 3 refer to suites formed by combining the forward-looking models
with RS1, RS2, and RS3, respectively.
The optimal simple rules in the ﬁrst and second columns are similar in that both
feature a high degree of interest smoothing along with large long-run responses to
inﬂation and real activity. Indeed, these policy rules diﬀer only slightly from the SW-
optimal rule. Bayesian policies 1 and 2 call for a bit less interest smoothing than in
the SW-optimal policy, and the long-run inﬂation and output responses are slightly
lower. This results in stronger short-run responses to inﬂation and output, hedging
slightly in the direction of the BGG- and SOE-optimal rules. This outcome reﬂects
the high probability weight on the SW model (greater than 80 percent in both suites),
the high fault tolerance of the other models with respect to the SW-optimal rule, and
the low fault tolerance of various models with respect to other model-speciﬁco p t i m a l
policies. Notice in particular that the backward-looking models in these suites have
little inﬂuence on Bayesian policy because they have low probability weight and high
fault tolerance.
Tables 8 and 9 provide more intuition about the Bayesian policies. Table 8 shows
relative loss in each model under the various Bayesian rules. As before, a value of
unity means that the Bayesian rule performs just as well as the model-speciﬁco p t i m a l
policy, and a large value indicates a substantial deterioration in performance. Table
9 breaks down expected loss into its components, viz. the standard deviations of
inﬂation, output, and nominal interest.
19Table 8: Relative Loss Under Bayesian Policies
Bayes 1 Bayes 2 Bayes 3
SW 1.04 1.07 1.11
BGG 106 84.5 142.1
SOE 3.01 2.66 7.67
RS1 3.57 — —
RS2 — 5.69 —
RS3 — — 1.09
Note: Losses are reported relative to the policy that is optimal in each model.
Table 9: Volatility Under Bayesian Policies
Bayes 1 Bayes 2 Bayes 3
SW 4.21 1.39 2.70 4.17 1.49 3.36 4.47 1.35 4.49
BGG 3.57 0.01 0.79 2.76 0.01 0.71 4.56 0.01 2.04
SOE 2.06 0.93 1.39 1.80 0.93 1.26 5.34 0.99 8.05
RS1 3.31 0.21 87.7 — —
RS2 — 5.66 1.94 308 —
RS3 — — 3.14 0.12 3.06
Note: The entries in each cell represent the standard deviation of inﬂation, output, and
nominal interest, respectively. Bayes 1, 2, and 3 refer to suites formed by combining the
forward-looking models with RS1, RS2, or RS3.
By design, Bayesian policies rule out indeterminate and explosive outcomes. There-
fore, in contrast with table 5, the losses reported in table 8 are all ﬁnite.10 Indeed,
except for the BGG model, relative loss never exceeds 10. Also, for the BGG model,
absolute loss never exceeds 5. As shown in table 3, this approximates the loss in the
SW model under the SW-optimal policy. Thus, although the Bayesian policies result
in large relative losses in the BGG model, they do not result in large absolute losses.
By hedging slightly in the direction of BGG- and SOE-optimal policies, the
Bayesian policy-maker tries to mitigate losses in the BGG and SOE models while
still achieving good performance in the SW model. Relative to the SW-optimal rule,
these policies reduce expected loss by two-thirds to three-quarters in the BGG model
and by about half in the SOE model. For both models, most of the improvement is
due to a reduction in inﬂation volatility. These gains are accomplished at the expense
of a slight rise in expected loss in the SW model, which increases by 4 and 7 per-
cent, respectively, in the two suites. Inﬂation volatility in the SW model is about the
same under the Bayesian policies as under the SW-optimal policy, but the standard
deviation of output is about 20-25 percent higher, and the standard deviation of the
nominal interest rate increases by a factor of 2 or 3.
10Empty cells refer to models not in the suite, not to inﬁnite or undeﬁned losses.
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policies than under the SW-optimal rule. As explained above, alternative policies
have little inﬂuence on inﬂation and output volatility in the RS models. Their main
inﬂuence is on nominal interest volatility. In the RS models, the nominal interest
rate is enormously volatile under the SW-optimal policy, and it is even more volatile
under Bayesian policies 1 and 2. The Bayesian decision maker is content with this
outcome because the RS models have low probability weights in suites 1 and 2.
Matters are diﬀerent in suite 3, which combines the forward-looking models with
RS3. Recall that this version of the RS model was estimated under a tight prior
featuring low output and inﬂation persistence. In this suite, the RS model has the
highest probability weight — approximately 80 percent — and the forward-looking mod-
els have low probability weights. Because the probability weight on the backward-
looking model is much greater than in the other suites, the Bayesian policy diﬀers
substantially from those in the ﬁrst two columns, involving a modest degree of in-
terest rate smoothing, a long-run inﬂation response coeﬃcient around 1.5, and small
response coeﬃcients to real activity (see the ﬁnal column of table 7). Except for
the small output coeﬃcients, this resembles a conventional Taylor rule with interest
smoothing.
Interestingly, for this suite the Bayesian policy diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the opti-
mal policy of its most probable member. Recall from the subsection 4.2.1 that the
RS3-optimal rule has response coeﬃcients close to zero on all arguments, approxi-
mating a pure nominal interest peg. According to RS3, monetary policy has little
inﬂuence on output because the slope of the IS curve is close to zero and shocks die
out quickly on their own. Roughly speaking, since movements in nominal interest are
penalized and have little inﬂuence on inﬂation or output, the best a central bank can
do is to minimize nominal interest volatility.
The RS3-optimal policy cannot be optimal for the suite, however, because it vio-
lates the Taylor principle and generates indeterminacy in the forward-looking models.
Because policy rules that generate indeterminate outcomes are heavily penalized, our
Bayesian central banker shies away from the RS3-optimal rule, as well as from any-
thing close to it. First and foremost, s/he seeks a rule that guarantees determinacy
in all the models. Within that family, s/he strikes a balance between performance
in the various models. The RS model is more inﬂuential here than in suites 1 and 2
because of its higher probability weight, but it cannot be dominant for policy because
its recommended policy generates inﬁnite loss in the other models.11
11Cogley and Sargent (2005) report the opposite ﬁnding for the U.S. During the Great Inﬂation,
backward-looking models were dominant for policy despite having low probability weights because
the policy designed for a more probable forward-looking model would have been disastrous for
backward-looking economies. In this suite, the backward-looking model has the highest probability
weight, yet its policy would be disastrous for forward-looking economies.
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interest volatility against requirements for determinacy in other members of the suite.
S/he strikes this balance by moving the long-run response coeﬃcient on inﬂation into
the determinacy region while leaving the response coeﬃcients on output close to zero
and smoothing interest rates to a modest extent.
The RS3 model performs well under this policy. Inﬂation and output volatility
are about the same as under the RS3-optimal policy, but the standard deviation of
the nominal interest rate is about 20 times higher. Although this increase in volatility
is costly, it pales in comparison with the expected cost of indeterminacy in the other
models. The Bayesian policy maker is content with this compromise, despite the high
probability weight on RS3.
The SW model also performs well under the Bayesian rule. No comparison is
possible with outcomes under the RS3-optimal policy because that rule generates
indeterminacy in the SW model. Relative to Bayesian policies 1 and 2, however,
inﬂation and output volatility are about the same, and the standard deviation of the
nominal interest rate is one- to two-thirds higher. With less interest smoothing, more
vigorous movements in the short-term interest rate are needed to stabilize output and
inﬂation. Although more interest smoothing and a higher long-run inﬂation response
would be desirable for this model, it would be counterproductive for the suite because
of its implications for nominal interest volatility in the RS3 model.
The BGG and SOE models also perform reasonably well under Bayesian rule 3.
Output volatility is roughly the same as under Bayesian policies 1 and 2, but inﬂation
and nominal interest volatility are higher. A more aggressive long-run response to
inﬂation and less interest smoothing would be desirable for these models, but again
would be counterproductive for RS3. Since the BGG and SOE models have low
probability weight in this suite, the policy maker is content with ensuring determinacy
and does not attempt to ﬁne-tune outcomes in these models.
4.2.4 Optimal simple rules under equal model weights
The forecasting literature has found that model averaging sometimes works better
when models are assigned simple (usually equal) weights as opposed to Bayesian
probability weights. With this result in mind, we repeat the policy design exercise
with equal model weights. Our loss function now becomes the simple average of
expected losses conditional on each individual model,
l(φ)=
1
m
Xm
i=1 li(φ). (8)
Like Bayesian model averaging, this approach rules out indeterminate and explosive
outcomes by design, preserving that important aspect of robustness.
The results are presented in tables 10 and 11. Table 10 records the optimal
22policy-rule coeﬃcients for each suite, and table 11 describes the volatility of inﬂation,
output, and nominal interest under these policies.
Table 10: Optimal policy coeﬃcients with equal model weights
Coeﬃc i e n t s S u i t e1 S u i t e2 S u i t e3
Smoothing 0.37 0.27 0.37
Inﬂation 2.55 2.17 2.57
Output 0.04 0.01 0.03
Output growth 0.63 0.57 0.64
Loss 3.58 4.68 3.53
Table 11: Volatility under equal-weight policies
Suite 1 Suite 2 Suite 3
SW 4.14 1.92 8.09 4.18 1.91 8.14 4.13 2.00 8.10
BGG 0.99 0.01 0.84 1.15 0.01 0.99 1.05 0.01 0.82
SOE 1.21 1.02 2.66 1.36 1.02 3.20 1.17 1.02 2.58
RS1 3.32 0.10 11.8 — —
RS2 — 5.82 0.30 21.9 —
RS3 — — 3.14 0.12 11.4
Note: the entries in each cell represent the standard deviation of inﬂation, output, and
nominal interest, respectively. Suites 1, 2, and 3 are formed by combining the forward-
looking models with RS1, RS2, or RS3.
In all three cases, the policies resemble speed-limit versions of the Taylor rule with
a modest degree of interest smoothing. The response coeﬃcients on output are close
to zero, those on output growth are around 0.6, the long-run response to inﬂation
ranges from 2.2 to 2.6, and the interest-smoothing parameter hovers around 0.35.
The policies are similar across suites, which shows that diﬀerences in the prior over
RS-model parameters have almost no impact on optimal policy over and above their
eﬀect on model weights.
In suites 1 and 2, the evenly-weighted policies deviate quite a bit more from the
SW-optimal rule than the Bayesian policies. There is a lot less interest smoothing,
the long-run response coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output are much smaller, and the
coeﬃcient on output growth falls by about two-thirds. This reﬂects the fact that the
BGG, SOE, and RS models are now assigned higher weight at the expense of the SW
model. In particular, the weights on SOE and RS rise from close to 0 to 0.25. Thus,
while a Bayesian policy maker could essentially ignore the SOE and RS models, that
is no longer the case. In particular, the consequences for nominal interest volatility
in the RS models must now be taken more seriously. As shown in table 11, outcomes
23in the BGG, SOE, and RS models improve, while those in the SW model deteriorate.
Inﬂation is less volatile in the BGG and SOE models and nominal interest volatility
is lower in the SOE and RS models. The biggest change is a decline in the standard
deviation of the nominal interest rate in the RS model, which falls from 87.7 to 11.8
in suite 1 and from 308 to 22 in suite 2. This is purchased at the expense of higher
output and nominal interest volatility in the SW model. The standard deviation of
output rises by 30 and 40 percent in the two suites and the standard deviation of the
nominal interest rate increases by 140 and 200 percent.
The contrast between equal- and Bayesian-weighted policies is less stark for suite
3. In this case, the main diﬀerence is that the equal-weight policy has a higher
speed-limit coeﬃcient (0.64 v. -0.01) and also a higher long-run inﬂation response
coeﬃent (2.57 v. 1.53). This reﬂects the fact that RS3 loses inﬂuence relative to
the forward-looking models. That reduces concerns about nominal interest volatility
in RS3 and increases the weight placed on obtaining good outcomes in the forward-
looking models, especially in the BGG and SOE models. Thus, in the RS3 model, the
standard deviation of the interest rate rises from 3.06 under Bayes policy 3 to 11.4
under the evenly-weighted policy. Performance in the SW model again deteriorates
under the evenly-weighted policy, with a 50 percent increase in the standard deviation
of output and an 80 percent increase in the standard deviation of the nominal interest
rate. Balanced against that deterioration are substantial improvements in outcomes
in the BGG and SOE models. In these models, the standard deviation of inﬂation
falls by almost 80 percent, and the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate
falls by 40 to 70 percent.
Whether these changes represent improvements relative to Bayesian policies de-
pends on one’s attitudes about model weights, which is subjective. There are cogent
arguments both for and against model averaging with equal weights. Arguments
in favor stress diﬃculties associated with managing the model set and estimating
Bayesian model probabilities. Arguments against stress that assigning equal weights
favors poor-ﬁtting models at the expense of good-ﬁtting models. As this is an open
area of research, we are content to present both sets of policies and to leave questions
about how best to assign model weights to future research.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper executes a Bayesian analysis of optimal monetary policy for the U.K.
Our method takes into account model and parameter uncertainty as well as un-
certainty about future shocks and outcomes. We examine a suite of models that
have received a lot of attention in the monetary policy, including versions of the
Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model, the Smets-Wouters (2007) model, the Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model, and the small-open-economy model of Gali and
24Monacelli (2005). We estimate each model using Bayesian methods and calculate
posterior model probabilities. Then we compute the coeﬃcients of a simple rule that
minimises expected losses, where expectations are taken across uncertainty about
shocks, parameters, and models, and where losses are deﬁned as a weighted sum of
the unconditional variance of inﬂation, the output gap and the change in the interest
rate. Since our methods are modular, adding new models to the suite is straight-
forward. Indeed, because of its modular nature, it would be possible to extend this
research through a network of decentralized modeling groups.
Several conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, the rule which is optimal
within each model diﬀers substantially across models. Our best estimates of the RS
model suggest there is little intrinsic inﬂation inertia. Since that model is backward
looking and shocks dissipate quickly on their own, the optimal RS rule is passive
and seeks mainly to minimize interest-rate volatility. Indeed, for two versions of the
RS model, the model-speciﬁc optimal policy approximates a pure nominal-interest
peg. At the other end of the spectrum, the policy optimal for the BGG model
is approximately equivalent to an inﬂation-only Taylor rule. Our estimates of the
BGG model ﬁnd little evidence of inﬂation inertia. Because this is a forward-looking
model, the optimal BGG rule responds very aggressively to deviations of inﬂation
from its target, with little response to other variables. Finally, the SW-optimal rule
approximates a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule for the nominal interest rate with high long-run
response coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output. This follows from the fact that the SW
model features sticker prices and both sticky wages and large and persistent cost-push
shocks, thus presenting a more challenging policy tradeoﬀ.
Second, the forward-looking models have low fault tolerance with respect to poli-
cies designed for the backward-looking models. Those policies either violate the Tay-
lor principle or barely satisfy the Taylor principle with long-run inﬂation response
coeﬃcients just above 1. Outcomes in the forward-looking models are poor in either
case.
In contrast, the backward-looking models have high fault tolerance with respect
to policies designed for forward-looking models. In this respect, results for the U.K.
contrast sharply with those for the U.S. One of the main challenges for the U.S.
is to ﬁnd a rule that works well both for forward- and backward-looking models.
Backward-looking models typically imply a high degree of intrinsic inﬂation persis-
tence when estimated with U.S. data. Policy rules that succeed in stabilizing inﬂation
in forward-looking models often result in excessive output variability in backward-
looking models, while gradualist rules well adapted to a backward-looking environ-
ment permit more inﬂation variabity in forward-looking models than one might like.
Finding a rule well adapted to both environments is diﬃcult. For the U.K., this turns
out not to be an issue because backward-looking models estimated with U.K. data
for the inﬂation-targeting period involve little instrinsic persistence. Thus, rules that
work well for forward-looking models also work well in our backward-looking models.
25Hence optimal rules bear a closer resemblance to those for forward-looking models
than would be the case for the U.S.
In two of the three suites, the backward-looking model has a low probability
weight. Since it is also highly fault tolerant, it has virtually no inﬂuence on the
optimal Bayesian policy. In those suites, the SW model has a high probability weight,
and the optimal Bayesian policy resembles the SW-optimal policy, with a slight hedge
in the direction of policies appropriate for the other forward-looking models. Relative
to the SW-optimal policy, the Bayesian policy improves outcomes substantially in the
other forward-looking models at the cost of a slight deterioration in outcomes in the
SW model.
In the third suite, the backward-looking model has a probability weight of 0.8,
and the forward-looking models collectively have weight of 0.2. Despite that, the
optimal Bayesian policy diﬀers subsantially from the policy that is optimal for the
backward-looking model, which violates the Taylor principle. Since we assign an
inﬁnite loss to indeterminate outcomes, our Bayesian policy maker shies away from
the RS-optimal rule, seeking ﬁrst and foremost a rule that guarantees determinacy
in all the models. Within that family, s/he strikes a balance between performance in
the various models. The optimal Bayesian policy in this case is a Taylor rule with
modest interest smoothing, a long-run inﬂation response around 1.5, and virtually no
reaction to output or output growth.
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A The Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model
The Rudebusch-Svensson model consists of three equations - a Phillips curve, an
IS curve, and a policy rule. Inﬂation is determined according to a reduced-form
Phillips curve,
πt =
P4
i=1 apiπt−i + ayyt−1 + εpt, (9)
where πt is inﬂation and yt is the output gap. For estimation, the output gap is
measured as linearly detrended output. Aggregate demand is governed by an IS
curve,
yt =
P2
i=1 byiyt−i + brrt−1 + εgt, (10)
where the ex post real interest rate rt is deﬁned as
rt−1 =( 1 /4)
P4
i=1 (it−i − πt−i). (11)
Finally, the monetary authorities set the nominal interest rate in accordance with a
Taylor-type rule,
it = φiit−1 +( 1− φi)
¡
φππt + φyyt
¢
+ φdy (yt − yt−1)+εrt. (12)
A.1 Priors for the RS model
Table 1 summarizes our baseline prior. Because the model lacks micro-foundations,
it is not easy for us to elicit an informative prior for its parameters. As a benchmark,
29we therefore choose a prior whose mode lies on Rudebusch and Svensson’s original
estimates. Its key features can be characterised as follows. First, the Phillips curve
encodes a high degree of intrinsic inﬂation persistence, with the lag coeﬃcients on
inﬂation summing to unity. Inﬂation is also more responsive to current output than
in conventional calibrations of new Keynesian models. The IS curve also encodes
instrinsic output persistence, with the lag coeﬃcients on output summing to 0.91.
On the other hand, the slope of the IS curve with respect to the real interest rate
is relatively small. Finally, the prior variances are large, reﬂecting the considerable
degree of uncertainty about the relevance of U.S. estimates for models of the U.K.
Table A1: Benchmark Prior for the Rudesbusch-Svennson model
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
ap1 Beta 0.6 0.22
ap2 Normal -0.1 0.2
ap3 Normal 0.28 0.2
ap4 Normal 0.12 0.2
ay Gamma 0.14 0.1
by1 Normal 1.16 0.3
by2 Normal -0.25 0.2
br Gamma 0.26 0.2
φr Beta 0.7 0.05
φπ -1 G a m m a 1 . 0 0 . 1
φy Normal 0.125 0.05
φdy Normal 0.125 0.05
σ2
p Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
g Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
r Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
We also examine the sensitivity of our results with respect to two alternative
priors: (1) tighter priors based on the original Rudebusch-Svensson estimates and
(2) tighter priors centred on simple AR(1) speciﬁcations involving a low degree of
inﬂation and output persistence. Those priors are summarized in tables 2 and 3.
30Table A2: A tight prior around the original RS estimates
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
ap1 Normal 0.7 0.1
ap2 Normal -0.1 0.1
ap3 Normal 0.28 0.1
ap4 Normal 0.12 0.1
ay Gamma 0.14 0.1
by1 Normal 1.16 0.1
by2 Normal -0.25 0.1
br Gamma 0.18 0.1
φr Beta 0.7 0.05
φπ − 1 Gamma 1.0 0.1
φy Normal 0.125 0.05
φdy Normal 0.125 0.05
σ2
p Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
g Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
r Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
Table A3: A tight prior around low inﬂation and output persistence
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
ap1 Normal 0.3 0.1
ap2 Normal 0.0 0.1
ap3 Normal 0.0 0.1
ap4 Normal 0.0 0.1
ay Gamma 0.14 0.1
by1 Normal 0.7 0.1
by2 Normal 0.0 0.1
br Gamma 0.18 0.1
φr Beta 0.7 0.05
φπ − 1 Gamma 1.0 0.1
φy Normal 0.125 0.05
φdy Normal 0.125 0.05
σ2
p Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
g Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
r Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
A.2 Posterior for the RS model
T a b l e4s u m m a r i z e st h ep o s t e r i o rd i s t ribution under the baseline prior. Two
aspects of the estimates are apparent. First, inﬂation and output are considerably
less persistent than in the prior. For instance, according to posterior mean estimates,
the lag coeﬃcients on inﬂation in the Phillips curve sum to 0.243, while the lag
31coeﬃcients on output in the IS curve sum to 0.423. Second, the slope of the IS curve
with respect to the real interest rate is smaller than in the prior. Indeed, the lower
end of a 95 percent credible set is only slightly above zero. If this coeﬃcient were
equal to zero, the central bank could not inﬂuence output or inﬂation via an interest-
rate rule, and realizations of output and inﬂation would be independent of policy-rule
parameters.
Table A4: Posterior for the Rudebusch-Svensson model (baseline prior)
Parameter Prior mean Post. mode Post. mean 5th %ile 95th %ile
ap1 0.6 0.1212 0.1592 0.0430 0.3171
ap2 -0.1 -0.0758 -0.0619 -0.2484 0.1264
ap3 0.28 -0.0758 -0.0442 -0.2423 0.1570
ap4 0.12 0.1919 0.1900 -0.0113 0.3838
ay 0.14 0.0506 0.1118 0.0201 0.2635
by1 1.16 0.4899 0.5069 0.3072 0.7139
by2 -0.25 -0.0606 -0.0842 -0.2729 0.1031
br 0.26 0.0506 0.0953 0.0167 0.2138
φr 0.7 0.9646 0.9589 0.9358 0.9781
φπ − 1 1.0 0.8636 0.8762 0.5996 1.1815
φy 0.125 0.1011 0.1275 0.0563 0.2220
φdy 0.125 0.0506 0.0603 0.0290 0.0989
σ2
p 0.25 0.4142 0.4213 0.3582 0.4953
σ2
g 0.25 0.2627 0.2699 0.2302 0.3174
σ2
r 0.25 0.1011 0.1009 0.0853 0.1193
Recall that the benchmark prior was centered on Rudebusch and Svensson’s esti-
mates for the U.S. Table 4 therefore documents that there is less instrinsic persistence
in U.K. data for the inﬂation-targeting period than in Rudebusch and Svensson’s
sample. To assess the robustness of this ﬁnding, we re-estimate the model using the
tighter RS prior listed in table 2. This represents an attempt to force high intrinsic
persistence onto the data. The posterior corresponding to this prior is summarized in
table 5. To our surprise, we found that the estimates are broadly similar to those for
the benchmark prior. As another robustness check, we re-estimate the model with an
informative prior involving low degrees of intrinsic persistence (see table 3). Table 6
summarizes the posterior associated with this prior. Once again, we ﬁnd that model’s
characteristics are qualitatively robust to changes in the prior.
32Table A5: RS model prosterior (A tight prior around the original RS estimates)
Parameter Prior mean Post. mode Post. mean 5th %ile 95th %ile
ap1 0.7 0.4545 0.4592 0.3160 0.6007
ap2 -0.1 -0.0909 -0.0981 -0.2309 0.0346
ap3 0.28 -0.0758 -0.0442 -0.2423 0.1570
ap4 0.12 0.1515 0.1504 0.0165 0.2812
ay 0.14 0.0607 0.1223 0.0212 0.2924
by1 1.16 0.9141 0.9199 0.7784 1.0561
by2 -0.25 -0.2121 -0.2217 -0.3563 -0.0928
br 0.18 0.0910 0.1164 0.0372 0.2243
φr 0.7 0.9646 0.9599 0.9372 0.9787
φπ − 1 1.0 0.8939 0.8854 0.6096 1.1755
φy 0.125 0.1011 0.1273 0.0566 0.2220
φdy 0.125 0.0506 0.0604 0.0292 0.0993
σ2
p 0.25 0.4647 0.4732 0.4010 0.5584
σ2
g 0.25 0.2930 0.3040 0.2575 0.3593
σ2
r 0.25 0.1011 0.1008 0.0853 0.1192
Table A6: RS model prosterior (tight prior around low inﬂation and output persistence)
Parameter Prior mean Post. mode Post. mean 5th %ile 95th %ile
ap1 0.3 0.1616 0.1695 0.0435 0.3053
ap2 0.0 -0.0152 -0.0235 -0.1590 0.1089
ap3 0.0 -0.0606 -0.0647 -0.1986 0.0717
ap4 0.0 0.0707 0.0792 -0.0539 0.2155
ay 0.14 0.0607 0.1197 0.0205 0.2878
by1 0.7 0.5707 0.5731 0.4379 0.7060
by2 0.0 -0.0152 -0.0107 -0.1380 0.1189
br 0.18 0.0910 0.1153 0.0377 0.2181
φr 0.7 0.9646 0.9591 0.9363 0.9782
φπ − 1 1.0 0.8485 0.8842 0.6186 1.1913
φy 0.125 0.1061 0.1272 0.0556 0.2226
φdy 0.125 0.0556 0.0602 0.0289 0.0988
σ2
p 0.25 0.4142 0.4237 0.3608 0.4981
σ2
g 0.25 0.2627 0.2717 0.2316 0.3189
σ2
r 0.25 0.1011 0.1008 0.0853 0.1192
33B A version of the Smets-Wouters (2007) model
B.1 The ﬁnal goods sector
The ﬁnal-goods sector is perfectly competitive and produces a ﬁnal good Yt by
bundling together a continuum of intermediate goods Yt (z). Final-good producers
choose inputs and outputs to maximize proﬁts,
max
Yt,Yt(i)
PtYt −
Z 1
0
Pt (z)Yt (z)dz s.t.
∙Z 1
0
G
µ
Yt (z)
Yt
;εp
¶
dz
¸
=1 , (13)
where Pt and Pt(z) a r et h ep r i c eo ft h eﬁnal and intermediate goods respectively,
and G is a strictly concave and increasing function characterised by G(1) = 1.T h e
variable ε
p
t is an exogenous shock that changes the elasticity of demand and therefore
the markup. We assume that ε
p
t follows an ARMA(1,1) process,
lnε
p
t = ρp lnε
p
t−1 − θpη
p
t + η
p
t,η
p
t ∼ N(0,σp) (14)
B.2 Intermediate-goods sector
The intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive and features sticky
prices. There is a continuum of intermediate-goods ﬁrms, indexed by z,w i t ht e c h -
nology
Yt (z)=ε
a
t (K
s
t (z))
α (Lt (z))
1−α − Φ. (15)
The variable Ks
t represents capital services, Lt is labour input, Φ is a ﬁxed cost, and
εa
t is an exogenous shock to total factor productivity. The technology shock follows
an AR(1) process,
lnε
a
t = ρz lnε
a
t−1 + η
a
t,η
a
t ∼ N(0,σa). (16)
The ﬁrm’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y
Pt (z)Yt (z) − WtLt (z) − R
k
tKt (z), (17)
where Wt is the aggregate nominal wage and Rk
t is the rental rate on capital.
Under Calvo pricing with partial indexation, a ﬁrm that is allowed to re-optimise
its price solves
max
∞ X
k=0
Etξ
k
pβ
kΞt+k
Ξt
Pt
Pt+k
Yt+k
h
e Pt(z)(Π
k
l=1π
ιp
t+l−1π
1−ιp
∗ ) − MCt+k
i
=0 , (18)
s.t.Yt+k(z)=G
0−1
µ
Pt(z)Xt.k
Pt+k
R 1
0 G
0
µ
Yt (z)
Yt
¶
Yt (z)
Yt
dz
¶
Yt+k, (19)
where e Pt(z) is the newly set price, ζp is the Calvo probability of being allowed to re-
optimise one’s price, πt = Pt/Pt−1 is gross inﬂation, β
k Ξt+k
Ξt
Pt
Pt+k is the ﬁrm’s nominal
34stochastic discount factor (which equals the discount factor for households). Following
Kimball (1995), G(·) is speciﬁed so that the demand for input Yt(z) is decreasing in its
relative price Pt(z)/Pt, with the elasticity of demand being a positive function of its
relative price. Finally, Xt.k = Πk
l=1π
ιp
t+l−1π
1−ιp
∗ ,u n l e s sk =0 , in which case Xt.k =1 .
The term Πk
l=1π
ιp
t+l−1 captures the fact that prices of ﬁrms that do not receive a price
signal are indexed to last period’s inﬂation rate, and the term π
1−ιp
∗ is an adjustment
for trend inﬂation.
B.3 Households
Households are indexed by a and have identical preferences deﬁned over the con-
sumption of a composite good C and hours worked L,
Et
∞ X
i=0
β
i
"
(Ct+i (a) − λCt+i−1 (a))
1−σc
1 − σc
#
exp
µ
(σc − 1)Lt+i(a)1+σl
1+σl
¶
. (20)
The parameter β ∈ (0,1) represents their subjective discount factor, σc is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl is the inverse elasticity of labor
supply, and λ governs the degree of external habit formation.
A household’s period-by-period budget constraint is given by
Ct (a)+It (a)+
Bt (a)
RtPt
− Tt (a) (21)
≤
Bt−1 (a)
Pt
+
Wh
t
Pt
Lt (a)+
Rk
tZt (a)Kt−1 (a)
RtPt
− a(Zt (a)Kt−1 (a)) +
Divt
Pt
,
where It represents gross investment, Bt is a nominally riskless discount bond paying
gross interest Rt, and Tt is net lump sum taxes. The household earns a nominal
wage Wh
t and collects ﬁnancial income from its bond holdings, from renting capital
to ﬁrms, and from collecting dividends distributed by the labour unions.
The capital-accumulation identity is
Kt (a)=( 1− δ)Kt−1 (a)+It+i (z)
∙
1 − S
µ
It (a)
It−1 (a)
¶¸
, (22)
where δ is the depreciation rate and S(.) is an adjustment-cost function, with with
S(1) = 0; S0(1) = 0 and S(.)00 > 0.
B.4 Intermediate labour union sector
The supply side of the labor market involves three agents: households, unions, and
labor packers. Households supply homogenous labour to a labour union which diﬀer-
entiates their labour services and sets wages following a Calvo mechanism. Unions
35sell diﬀerentiated labor to labor packers, who re-package labor services and sell them
to intermediate-goods producers.
Working backwards, intermediate-goods producers employ a composite Lt of labor
services,
Lt =
∙Z 1
0
Lt(l)
1
1−λw,tdl
¸1−λw,t
. (23)
This composite is supplied by labor packers, who maximize proﬁts in a perfectly
competitive environment. Demand for variety Lt(l) is therefore given by
Lt(l)=
µ
Wt(l)
Wt
¶−
1−λw,t
λw,t
Lt. (24)
Labor packers buy variety Lt(l) from labor unions. The unions allocate and
diﬀerentiate labour services from the households and have market power. In their
negotiations with labour packers, unions take the household’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption and labour as the cost of labour services. The unions
choose the wage subject to the labour demand equation and to nominal rigidities á la
Calvo. Speciﬁcally, unions can readjust wages with probability 1−ζw in each period.
For those that cannot adjust wages, Wt(l) increases at the weighted average of the
steady state inﬂation π∗ and of last period’s inﬂation πt−1. For those that can adjust,
the problem is to choose a wage f Wt(l) that maximizes wage income in all states where
the union is stuck with that wage:
max
∞ X
k=0
Etζ
k
wβ
kΞt+k
Ξt
Pt
Pt+k
Lt+k(l)
£
Wt+k(l) − W
h
t+k
¤
=0 , (25)
where Wt+k(l)=f Wt(l)(Π
k
l=1π
ιw
t+l−1π
1−ιw
∗ ), (26)
The markup above the marginal disutility is distributed to the households in the form
of a union dividend.
B.5 Government Policies
The government’s nominal budget constraint is given by
PtGt + Bt−1 = Tt +
Bt
Rt
, (27)
where Gt is exogenous government spending. Government spending expressed relative
to the steady-state-output path follows an AR(1) process,
lngt = ρg lngt−1 +  
g
t, 
g
t ∼ N(0,σ g). (28)
36The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule,
Rt
R∗ =
µ
Rt−1
R∗
¶φR
"µ
πt
π∗
¶φπ µ
Yt
Y
∗
t
¶φy
#1−φR µ
Yt/Yt−1
Y
∗
t /Y
∗
t−1
¶φdy
mt, (29)
where R∗ is the steady-state gross nominal interest rate and Y
∗
t is the natural output.
The parameter φR determines the degree of interest rate smoothing, and φπ,φ y,φ dy
are feedback coeﬃcients on inﬂation, the output gap, and output growth, respectively.
The monetary-policy shock mt evolves exogenously according to
lnmt = ρmlnmt−1 +  m,t. (30)
B.6 Priors for the SW model
Table 7 displays our prior distribution. Priors on consumer-preference parameters
are centered on standard values and are relatively tight. The intertemporal subsitu-
tion elasticity has a mean of unity, and the mean degree of habit persistence is 0.7.
The labor-supply elasticity is centered on 2, and the discount rate is calibrated at
0.9925.
Technology parameters are also centered on standard values. The capital share
in intermediate-good production and the depreciation rate are calibrated at 0.36 and
0.025, respectively. Prior means for parameters governing the elasticities of capital
utilisation and the investment-adjustment cost are the same as in Smets and Wouters
(2007). The mode of the share of ﬁxed costs in production is approximately 0.3.
For Calvo-pricing parameters, the probability of re-optimizing prices and wages is
normal distributed with a prior mean of 0.75 and a prior standard deviation of 0.1.
For the degree of price and wage indexation, we pick a diﬀuse distribution centred on
0.5.
With respect to shocks, priors for the persistence parameters reﬂect our belief that
government-spending and productivity shocks are persistent while monetary-policy
and cost-push shocks decay quickly. Persistence parameters for TFP and government-
spending shocks have a mean of 0.7, while those for cost-push and monetary-policy
shocks have a mean of 0.3. Priors for the standard deviations are standard. Finally,
the prior for policy-rule parameters is the same as in the Rudebusch-Svensson (1999)
model.
37Table A7: Priors for the Smets-Wouters model
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
σ2
a Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
g Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
m Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
p Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
ρa Beta 0.8 0.1
ρg Beta 0.8 0.1
ρm Beta 0.3 0.1
ρp Beta 0.3 0.1
θp Normal 0.1 0.05
ϕ Normal 4.0 0.5
σc Normal 1.0 0.1
λ Beta 0.7 0.1
σl Normal 2.0 0.2
ζp Beta 0.75 0.1
ζw Beta 0.75 0.1
ιw Beta 0.5 0.2
ιp Beta 0.5 0.2
θu Beta 0.5 0.2
Φ Gamma 0.4 0.2
φπ − 1 Gamma 1.0 0.2
φR Beta 0.7 0.1
φy Normal 0.125 0.05
φdy Normal 0.125 0.05
λw Calibrated 10
λp Calibrated 10
β Calibrated 0.995
α Calibrated 0.36
δ Calibrated 0.025
B.7 Posterior for the SW model
Table 8 summarises the model’s posterior distribution. Several features are im-
mediately apparent. First of all, for many parameters, posteriors are not far from the
priors. This shows that the large size of the SW model combined with our limited
number of data series and short sample pose a number of identiﬁcation problems.
Thus, along several dimensions, parameter values are eﬀectively set via the priors.
38Table A8: Posterior for the Smets-Wouters model
Parameter Prior mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 5th %ile 95th %ile
σ2
a 0.25 0.2400 0.2793 0.1806 0.4215
σ2
g 0.25 0.1773 0.1869 0.1319 0.2477
σ2
m 0.25 0.0797 0.0845 0.0657 0.1081
σ2
p 0.25 0.3655 0.3694 0.2995 0.4525
ρa 0.8 0.8478 0.8484 0.7709 0.9165
ρg 0.8 0.8377 0.8197 0.6544 0.9436
ρm 0.3 0.3135 0.3125 0.1691 0.4657
ρp 0.3 0.2228 0.2367 0.1164 0.3770
θp 0.1 0.1068 0.1170 0.0385 0.1971
ϕ 4.0 4.1818 4.1406 3.3510 4.9424
σc 1.0 1.1515 1.1715 0.9335 1.4361
λ 0.7 0.8023 0.7760 0.6407 0.8872
σl 2.0 1.9697 1.9806 1.6506 2.3063
ζp 0.75 0.7191 0.7040 0.5316 0.8491
ζw 0.75 0.7923 0.7714 0.6299 0.8900
ιw 0.5 0.4345 0.4473 0.1436 0.7808
ιp 0.5 0.1623 0.2291 0.0674 0.4431
θu 0.5 0.6865 0.6296 0.3284 0.8696
Φ 0.4 0.4654 0.5114 0.2169 0.8996
φπ − 1 1.0 0.8157 0.8719 0.5989 1.1890
φR 0.7 0.9566 0.9519 0.9271 0.9725
φy 0.125 0.1037 0.0859 0.0472 0.1766
φdy 0.125 0.2788 0.2906 0.1831 0.4104
For instance, similar to other studies, we ﬁnd that the parameters governing the
degree of nominal rigidity are not well identiﬁed. One notable exception is the degree
of price indexation, which is estimated to be considerably lower compared to the
prior. Investment-adjustment costs are also weakly identiﬁed, most likely because we
do not include investment amongst our observations.
For several parameters, however, the data are informative. For instance, the
estimated degree of price indexation is considerably lower compared to the prior.
The variance of the monetary shock is smaller compared to its prior mean while
that of the cost-push shock is larger. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
is somewhat lower than the prior of unity, while the weight of habits is somewhat
higher than the prior, with a mode close to 0.8. The data are also informative about
the elasticity of capital utilisation costs, which is estimated to be relatively high.
This implies that movements in capital utilisation will not be as pronounced as, for
example, in models such as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) where this
39elasticity is estimated to be extremely low. The mode of the share of ﬁxed costs in
production is higher than the prior, standing at just over 0.4.
T h ed a t aa r ea l s oi n f o r m a t i v ea b o u tt h em o n e t a r y - p o l i c yr u l e .N o t a b l y ,t h ed e g r e e
of interest rate smoothing is very high despite the tight prior. The response to
real variables seems to occur mainly in responding to the growth rate and less in
responding to the level of output.
C Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
The model includes ﬁve types of agents - households, entrepreneurs, ﬁnancial
intermediaries, ﬁnal goods retailers, and the central bank.
C.1 The household’s decision problem
The representative household maximises:
Et
X∞
s=0 β
s [ν logct+s +( 1− ν)log(1− ht+s)], (31)
subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
ct + bt+1 = Rt−1bt + wtht + Γt − Tt. (32)
Aggregate consumption is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of diﬀerentiated goods consump-
tion ct (i),
ct =
∙Z 1
0
ct (i)
λp−1
λp di
¸ λp
λp−1
, (33)
ht represents hours worked, bt is a real bond which pays out Rt units of the composite
consumption good in period t +1 , rt is the rental rate of capital, wt is the real wage
rate, Γt are the proﬁts of retailers, Tt is a lump-sum tax, mt is nominal money
holdings. The price of the composite consumption good is
pt =
∙Z 1
0
pt (i)
1−λp di
¸ 1
1−λp
.
The parameter β is the subjective discount factor, λp is the elasticity of substitution
across varieties, and ν is the weight on consumption in the period utility function of
the household.
C.2 The entrepreneurs’ problem
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and have ﬁnite lives. They supply labour ser-
vices to ﬁnal goods ﬁrms inelastically, but their main source of funds are investment
40projects. Entrepreneurs are endowed with the technology to make capital goods from
consumption goods. They maximise the following objective:
Et
X∞
s=0 (βγ)
s c
e
t+s, (34)
subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
c
e
t + qtkt+1 + wth
h
t − bt+1 =m a x
∙
ωt
µ
yt
Xt
+ qt (1 − δ)kt
¶
− Rt−1bt,0
¸
, (35)
where ce
t is entrepreneurial consumption, hh
t is the employment of household labour, qt
is the price of capital in terms of ﬁnal goods, and δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
Finally, in order to motivate default and agency problems in the model, BGG assume
that total revenue is subject to an idiosyncratic i.i.d. shock ωt which has a mean
of unity and a variance of σ2
ω. Total revenue consists of the value of capital after
depreciation qt (1 − δ)kt plus the value of entrepreneurs’ intermediate goods’ output
in terms of the ﬁnal good yt/Xt,w h e r eXt is the mark-up of retailers over marginal
cost.
The entrepreneur has limited liability and can default on his/her debt if the total
revenue from his/her project falls short of the value of debt. Furthermore, a fraction
γ of entrepreneurs die in every period, which explains the diﬀerent discount factor of
entpreneurs relative to workers.
The technology for the production of intermediate goods is Cobb-Douglas in cap-
ital kt,h o u s e h o l dl a b o u rhh
t and entrepreneurial labour he
t,
yt = ε
a
tk
α
t
³¡
h
h
t
¢Ω
(h
e
t)
1−Ω
´1−α
. (36)
Output is subject to the common productivity shock At, α is the share of capital in
national income, Ω(1 − α) is the share of household labour, while (1 − Ω)(1− α) is
the income share of entrepreneurial labour.
Aggregate capital accumulates with investment net of capital adjustment costs,
Kt+1 =
"µ
It
Kt
¶1+ϕ
+1− δ
#
Kt, (37)
where ϕ is the elasticity of capital-adjustment costs with respect to the investment
rate. Total factor productivity follows the following process:
lnε
a
t = ρA lnε
a
t + η
A
t . (38)
C.3 The problem of the ﬁnancial intermediary
Under the assumption of no aggregate uncertainty, the risk-neutral perfectly-
competitive ﬁnancial intermediary accepts riskless deposits from households and lends
41them to entrepreneurs. Deposits are riskless because the idiosyncratic productivity
shock is iid across entrepreneurs and therefore the default loss is perfectly predictable
in the aggregate. The intermediary, therefore, expects a return equal to the risk-free
rate on each individual contracts it enters into.
Financial contracting takes place in the ‘costly state veriﬁcation’ environment
described by Townsend (1979). Only the entrepreneur can costlessly ﬁnd out the
revenue from the project, ωt (yt + qt (1 − δ)kt).O u t s i d e r ss u c ha st h eﬁnancial inter-
mediary can only verify the project output by paying a cost which is a proportion
μ of total output. This cost has the interpretation of a bankruptcy cost because, in
equilibrium, it is only paid when the entrepreneur declares bankruptcy.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) show that the proﬁt-maximisation problem
of the ﬁnancial intermediary can be more conveniently represented as a maximisation
of the utility of the entrepeneur subject to a break-even constraint for the intermedi-
ary:
max
bt,Rb
t
Et max
£
ωtR
k
t+1qt+1 (nt + bt) − R
b
tbt,0
¤
, (39)
where Rk
t+1 =( rt+1 +(1− δ)qt+1)/qt is the return to holding capital and kt = nt +bt
equals total capital purchases by the entrepreneur. The inermediary chooses the
debt level bt and the debt interest rate Rb
t as a function of entrepreneurial net worth
nt in order to maximise the utility of the borrower, which is equal to the expected
project revenue net of debt repayments, taking into account the option to default.
The break-even constraint is given by:
Et min
£
R
b
tbt,(1 − μ)ωtR
k
t+1qt+1 (nt + bt)
¤
= Rtbt. (40)
C.4 The problem of the retailer
To motivate price stickiness, BGG assume that perfectly-competitive entrepre-
neurs sell their output to monopolistically-competitive retailers who costlessly diﬀer-
entiate it and sell it to households at a mark up. Retailers set prices according to
a Calvo pricing model with backward-looking indexation. With probability 1 − ζp a
retailer is free to re-optimise his or her price in any given period. With probability
ζp, it cannot re-optimise but can index its price to a weighted average of last period’s
inﬂation rate and the steady state inﬂation. A retailer who is able to re-optimise its
price will choose its new price is p∗
t (i) to maximise
max
p∗
t(i)
Et
∞ X
s=0
ζ
s
pΛt,t+s
"
p∗
t (i)(Πt,t+s)
ιp ¡
Π∗
t,t+s
¢1−ιp
pt+s
−
1
Xt+s
#
yt+s (i), (41)
where Λt,t+s is the household’s stochastic discount factor, Πt,t+s is cumulative inﬂation
between t and t+s,a n dιp is degree to which retailers who are unable to re-optimise
price get to index their price in line with past inﬂation.
42C.5 Government policies
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the following
Taylor-type rule
Rt
R∗ =
µ
Rt−1
R∗
¶φR
"µ
πt
π∗
¶φπ µ
Yt
Y
∗
t
¶φy
#1−φR µ
Yt/Yt−1
Y
∗
t /Y
∗
t−1
¶φdy
mt, (42)
where
lnmt = ρmlnmt−1 +  m,t,  m,t ∼ N
¡
0,σ
2
m
¢
(43)
is an exogenous monetary-policy shock and Y
∗
t denotes the level of output under
ﬂexible prices and wages. The ﬁscal authority runs a balanced budget in every period,
using seigniorage and lump sum tax revenues (levied on the household) to fund its
expenditure,
Gt =
Mt − Mt−1
Pt
+ Tt. (44)
Government expenditures are exogenous and evolve as
lnGt = ρg lnGt−1 +  
g
t,  g,t ∼ N
¡
0,σ
2
g
¢
(45)
C.6 Market clearing
T h eg o o d sm a r k e tc l e a r sw h e n
Yt = C
h
t + C
e
t + It + DCt + Gt, (46)
where Ch
t and Ce
t are, respectively, the aggregate consumption levels of households
and entrepreneurs, It is aggregate investment, and DCt is the total veriﬁcation cost
paid by the ﬁnancial intermediary to audit bankrupt entrepreneurs.
C.7 Priors
The priors on the BGG model (at least for those parameters that overlap) do
not diﬀer much from those of the SW model described in the previous subsection.
Those are described in Table 9. Since we do not use data on investment or private
interest rates in our estimation procedure, identifying the parameters that govern
the ﬁnancial contracting problems is problematic. Therefore, we calibrate those to
t h ev a l u e sc h o s e nb yB G G .T h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ei d i o s y n c r a t i cp r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c ki s
calibrated at 0.28, the costs of bankruptcy (or monitoring costs in the costly-state-
veriﬁcation framework of the paper) are set at 0.12 of ﬁrm output. The share of
capital in output is set at 0.36 and the depreciation rate at 0.025 per quarter. The
BGG model assumes log-utility in both consumption and leisure. The weight on
43leisure in period utility is calibrated to ensure that individuals work approximately
one third of their total time endowment.
Table A9: Priors for the BGG
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
ν Gamma 0.5 0.2
ζp Beta 0.7 0.1
ιp Beta 0.5 0.2
φR Beta 0.7 0.1
φπ − 1 Gamma 1.0 0.2
φy Normal 0.125 0.05
φdy Normal 0.125 0.05
ρa Beta 0.8 0.1
ρg Beta 0.8 0.1
ρm Beta 0.3 0.1
ρp Beta 0.3 0.1
σ2
a Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
g Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
m Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
σ2
p Inverse Gamma 0.25 0.2
λp Calibrated 10
β Calibrated 0.995
α Calibrated 0.36
δ Calibrated 0.025
μ Calibrated 0.12
σ2
ω Calibrated 25
Ω Calibrated 0.99
C.8 Posteriors
Estimation results are displayed in Table 10. In many respects, estimates for
the BGG model agree with those for the SW model. Monetary shocks are relatively
small and cost-push and demand shocks relatively large. The perisistence of TFP and
government spending shocks are accurately estimated as very high. The results diﬀer,
however, in one important respect. The degree of price stickiness is considerably
lower than in the SW model, implying that prices are re-optimized once every 1.5
quarters. Because our estimates imply little nominal rigidity, inﬂation is volatile but
not persistent.
44Table A10: Posterior for the BGG
Parameter Prior Mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 5th %ile 95th %ile
μ 0.5 0.6660 0.7427 0.4266 1.1335
ζp 0.75 0.3542 0.3555 0.2723 0.4388
ιp 0.5 0.3243 0.3396 0.1078 0.6397
φR 0.7 0.6667 0.6580 0.5288 0.7643
φπ - 1 1 0.9755 1.0274 0.7334 1.3681
φy 0.125 0.1068 0.1242 0.0552 0.2143
φdy 0.125 0.0925 0.1075 0.0481 0.1856
ρa 0.8 0.8932 0.8840 0.8339 0.9264
ρg 0.8 0.8932 0.8840 0.8339 0.9264
ρm 0.3 0.2741 0.2767 0.2303 0.3316
ρp 0.3 0.2938 0.3151 0.1586 0.4952
σ2
a 0.25 0.2741 0.2767 0.2303 0.3316
σ2
g 0.25 0.6392 0.6604 0.4886 0.8732
σ2
m 0.25 0.1465 0.2025 0.1050 0.3748
σ2
p 0.25 0.3077 0.3242 0.2228 0.4535
D A small-open-economy model a la Gali and Mona-
celli (2005)
In this section we consider a small open economy framework, which follows closely
the speciﬁcation Gali and Monacelli (2005) (GM hereafter) and De Paoli (2009). A
small open economy is characterised as a limiting case of a two-country dynamic
general equilibrium model,12 and monopolistic competition and sticky prices are in-
troduced in order to address issues of monetary policy. In particular, the model
assumes that home price setting follows a Calvo-type contract and features complete
pass-through, as producers set prices set in their own currency. In addition, the law
of one price holds, but deviations from purchasing power parity arise because of home
bias in consumption. Finally, domestic and foreign agents optimally share risk.
D.1 Preferences
We consider two countries, H (Home) and F (Foreign). The world economy
is populated with a continuum of agents of unit mass, where the population in the
segment [0,n) belongs to country H and the population in the segment (n,1] belongs
12Gali and Monacelli (2005) assume that the world is populated by a continuum of small open
economies, but the ﬁnal equilibrium conditions for the two representations are identical.
45to country F. The utility function of a consumer j in country H is given by
Ut = Et
∞ X
i=0
β
i £
U(ε
a
t+i,C t+i (a)) − V (ε
a
t+i,y t+i(a))
¤
with U(Ct+i (a)) =
(Ct+i (a)/εa
t+i)1−σc
1 − σc
and V (ε
a
t+i,y t+i(a)) =
(yt+i(a)/εa
t+i)1+σl
1+σl
. (47)
Households obtain utility from consumption Ct+i (a) and disutility from producing
ad i ﬀerenciated domestic goods yt+i(a). The parameter β ∈ (0,1) represents their
subjective discount factor, σc is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, σl is the inverse elasticity of labor supply and productivity shocks are denoted by
εa
s. C is a C.E.S. (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregate of home and foreign
goods, deﬁned by
C =
h
v
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H +( 1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F
i θ
θ−1
. (48)
The parameter θ>0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign-produced goods, CH and CF. As in Sutherland (2005), the parameter
determining home consumers’ preferences for foreign goods, (1 − v), is a function of
t h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h ef o r e i g ne c o n o m y ,(1 − n),a n do ft h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s s ,α;
more speciﬁcally, (1 − v)=( 1− n)α.
Similar preferences are speciﬁed for the rest of the world
C
∗ =
h
v
∗1
θC
∗θ−1
θ
H +( 1− v
∗)
1
θC
∗θ−1
θ
F
i θ
θ−1
, (49)
with v∗ = nα. That is, foreign consumers’ preferences for home goods depend on
t h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h eh o m ee c o n o m ya n dt h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s s . N o t et h a tt h e
speciﬁcation of v and v∗ generates a home bias in consumption.
The sub-indices CH (C∗
H)a n dCF (C∗
F) are Home (Foreign) consumption of the
diﬀerentiated products produced in countries H and F. These are deﬁned as follows
CH =
"µ
1
n
¶ 1
λp Z n
0
c(z)
λp−1
λp dz
# λp
λp−1
,C F =
"µ
1
1 − n
¶ 1
λp Z 1
n
c(z)
λp−1
λp dz
# λp
λp−1
,
(50)
C
∗
H =
"µ
1
n
¶ 1
λp Z n
0
c
∗ (z)
λp−1
λp dz
# λp
λp−1
,C
∗
F =
"µ
1
1 − n
¶ 1
λp Z 1
n
c
∗ (z)
λp−1
λp dz
# λp
λp−1
,
(51)
where λp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the diﬀerentiated products. The
consumption-based price indices that correspond to the above speciﬁcations of pref-
erences are given by
P =
h
vP
1−θ
H +( 1− v)(PF)
1−θ
i 1
1−θ
, (52)
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P
∗ =
h
v
∗P
∗1−θ
H +( 1− v
∗)(P
∗
F)
1−θ
i 1
1−θ
, (53)
where PH (P∗
H) is the price sub-index for home-produced goods expressed in the
domestic (foreign) currency and PF (P∗
F) is the price sub-index for foreign produced
goods expressed in the domestic (foreign) currency:
PH =
∙µ
1
n
¶Z n
0
p(z)
1−λp dz
¸ 1
1−λp
,P F =
∙µ
1
1 − n
¶Z 1
n
p(z)
1−λp dz
¸ 1
1−λp
, (54)
P
∗
H =
∙µ
1
n
¶Z n
0
p
∗ (z)
1−λp dz
¸ 1
1−λp
,P
∗
F =
∙µ
1
1 − n
¶Z 1
n
p
∗ (z)
1−λp dz
¸ 1
1−λp
. (55)
We assume that the law of one price holds, so
p(h)=Sp
∗(h) and p(f)=Sp
∗(f), (56)
where the nominal exchange rate, St, denotes the price of foreign currency in terms of
domestic currency. Equations (52) and (53), together with condition (56), imply that
PH = SP∗
H and PF = SP∗
F. However, as Equations (54) and (55) illustrate, the home
bias speciﬁcation leads to deviations from purchasing power parity; that is, P 6= SP∗
For this reason, we deﬁne the real exchange rate as Q ≡ SP∗
P .
From consumers’ preferences, we can derive the total demand for a generic good
h, produced in country H, and the demand for a good f, produced in country F
y
d
t(h)=
∙
pt(h)
PH,t
¸−λp ∙
PH,t
Pt
¸−θ "
vCt +
v∗(1 − n)
n
µ
1
Qt
¶−θ
C
∗
t
#
, (57)
y
d
t(f)=
∙
pt(f)
PF,t
¸−λp ∙
PF,t
Pt
¸−θ "
(1 − v)n
1 − n
Ct +( 1− v
∗)
µ
1
Qt
¶−θ
C
∗
t
#
. (58)
Finally, to portray a small open economy, we use the deﬁnition of v and v∗ and take
the limit for n → 0. Consequently, conditions (57) and (58) can be rewritten as
y
d(h)=
∙
pt(h)
PH,t
¸−λp ∙
PH,t
Pt
¸−θ "
(1 − α)Ct + α
µ
1
Qt
¶−θ
C
∗
t
#
, (59)
y
d(f)=
"
p∗
t(f)
P∗
F,t
#−λp ∙
P∗
F,t
P∗
t
¸−θ
C
∗
t . (60)
Equations (59) and (60) show that external changes in consumption aﬀect demand
in the small open economy, but the opposite is not true. Moreover, movements in the
real exchange rate do not aﬀect the rest of the world’s demand.
47D.2 Price-setting Mechanism
Prices follow a Calvo-style partial adjustment rule. Producers of diﬀerentiated
goods know the form of their individual demand functions (given by Equations (59)
and (60)), and maximize proﬁts taking overall market prices and products as given.
In each period a fraction, ζp ∈ [0,1), of randomly chosen producers is not allowed to
change the nominal price of the goods they produce. The remaining fraction of ﬁrms,
given by (1 − ζp), chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected discounted
value of proﬁts. The optimal choice of producers that can set their price ˜ pt(j) at time
T is, therefore
Et
(
X
(ζpβ)
T−tUc(CT)
µ
˜ pt(j)
PH,T
¶−λp
YH,T
∙
˜ pt(j)
PH,T
PH,T
PT
−
λpVy (˜ yt,T(j),ε a
t)
(λp − 1)Uc(CT)
¸)
=0 .
(61)
Given the Calvo-type setup, the price index evolves according to the following law of
motion,
(PH,t)
1−σ = ζpP
1−σ
H,t−1 +
¡
1 − ζp
¢
(˜ pt(h))
1−σ . (62)
The rest of the world has an analogous price setting mechanism.
D.3 Complete Markets
Agents have access to state-contingent claims that allow them optimally to share
risk with the rest of the world. Following Chari et al (2002), this asset market
structure implies the following risk-sharing condition,
UC (C∗
t )
UC (Ct)
=
StP∗
t
Pt
. (63)
D.4 Government policies
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the following
Taylor-type rule
Rt
R∗ =
µ
Rt−1
R∗
¶φR
"µ
πt
π∗
¶φπ µ
Yt
Y
∗
t
¶φy
#1−φR
mt, (64)
where
lnmt = ρmlnmt−1 +  m,t,  m,t ∼ N
¡
0,σ
2
m
¢
(65)
is an exogenous monetary-policy shock and Y
∗
t denotes the level of output under
ﬂexible prices.
48D.5 Estimation
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) (LS hereafter), we estimate a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of GM in which σl =0and θ =1 . The system of equilibrium conditions is
estimated with variables measured in percentage deviations from a balanced growth
path, induced by the technology process εa
t,
lnε
a
t =l nε
a
t−1 + z
a
t , lnz
a
t = ρz lnz
a
t−1 + η
a
t,η
a
t ∼ N(0,σa). (66)
The estimated system can be summarised by a Phillips curve (PC), a forward looking
IS equation (IS) and a risk sharing equation (RS) and the policy rule (PR):
πt + α∆st = k/α0(yt − ¯ yt)+β(Etπt+1 + αEt∆st+1), (PC)
yt = Etyt+1 − α0(Rt − Etπt+1 − αEt∆st+1)+Et∆¯ yt+1 − Etza
t+1, (IS)
∆yt = ∆y∗
t + α0∆st, (RS)
Rt = φRRt−1 +( 1− φR)
h
(1 + ˜ φπ)πt + φy(yt − ¯ yt)
i
+ εR
t . (PR)
The variable y denotes domestic output, s represents the terms of trade (note that
(1 − α)s = −q), ¯ y = −α(2 − α)(1 − τ)/τy∗ is potential output, R is the nominal
interest rate, π represents CPI inﬂation, and output in the rest of the world follows
y
∗
t = ρ
∗y
∗
t−1 + η
∗
t,η
∗
t ∼ N(0,σ y∗). (67)
Moreover, we deﬁne φπ =1+˜ φπ,α 0 = σ−1
c +α(2−α)(1−σ−1
c ), and k =( 1−ζpβ)(1−
ζp)/ζp.
D.5.1 Priors
The choice of prior mean, distribution and standard deviation for the remaining
parameters follows LS and are presented in Table 11. The mean of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (σ−1
c ) is set to 0.5 with standard deviation of 0.2. The
assumption implies an average coeﬃcient of risk aversion higher than unity. Given
that the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is set to unity (θ =1 ) ,w eh a v et h a t
σcθ>1. Thus, under the prior mean, domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in
utility. The prior for the slope of the Phillips curve (k)i sc e n t e r e da t0 . 5a n dh a sa
standard deviation of 0.25. The policy-rule parameters ˜ φπ and φy are centered at 0.54
49and 0.25 respectively and are assumed to follow a gamma distribution. In addition,
the prior mean of β is set to yield an annual interest rate of 2.51 percent, and the
degree of openness is centered at 0.2.
As chosen by LS when estimating the model on UK data, the standard deviations
of productivity and external shocks (σa,σy∗) are centered at 1.5 with a standard
deviation of 4, but the mean of the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks
(σm), is set at 0.5. These follow an inverted gamma distribution. The persistence
of productivity and foreign shocks (ρz,ρ y∗) is centered at 0.2 and 0.9, respectively,
while the persistence of the interest rate (φR) has mean 0.5. Persistence parameters
are assumed to follow a beta distribution.
T a b l eA 1 1 :P r i o r sf o rt h eG a l i - M o n a c e l l im o d e l
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
φR Beta 0.5 0.2
˜ φπ = φπ − 1 Gamma 0.54 0.5
φy Gamma 0.25 0.13
ρz Beta 0.2 0.1
ρy∗ Beta 0.9 0.05
σa Inverse Gamma 1.5 4
σy∗ Inverse Gamma 1.5 4
σ2
m Inverse Gamma 0.5 4
k∗ Gamma 0.5 0.25
R Gamma 2.51 1
α Beta 0.2 0.05
σ−1
c Gamma 0.5 0.2
σl Calibrated 0
θ Calibrated 1
Note: ∗k =( 1− ζpβ)(1 − ζp)/ζp
D.5.2 Posteriors
Estimation results are shown in Table 12. The results present a tight posterior
distribution for the persistence in the policy rule (φR), with the posterior mode at
0.85. This estimate is between the levels found in the SW and BGG models. The
posterior mode for the coeﬃcient of inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep o l i c yr u l e( φπ) is 0.66, which is
also similar to the one obtained in SW and BGG, though the posterior distribution
in GM present a large positive skew. The coeﬃc i e n to no u t p u tg a pi nt h ep o l i c yr u l e
(φy) is larger than the ones estimated in the previous models, but we should note
that the GM model does not allow the policy rule to respond to output growth. The
posterior distribution for the external shock persistence and standard deviation are
tight and the posterior modes do not depart signiﬁcantly from the prior mean. On
50the other hand the posterior mode for the standard deviation for the other shocks is
much smaller than the assumed in the prior distribution.
The posterior mode for the slope of the Phillips curve suggest a degree of price
stickiness below the one found in the SWm o d e lb u ta b o v et h eo n ef o u n di nt h eB G G
model. The estimates for the rates of return suggest a subjective discount factor
similar to the one calibrated in the previous models (that is, the posterior mode for
R is consistent with a β equal to 0.995). Turning to the parameters with a direct
international dimension, the posterior distribution for the degree of openness is con-
centrated near the mode. And the estimated mode is around 0.34, which implies an
import share slightly larger than the one found in the UK. Finally the posterior mode
for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated at 0.65, which implies a
coeﬃcient of risk aversion of around 1.5, and suggests that UK imports tend to be
substitutes to domestically produced goods.
Table A12: Gali-Monacelli model posterior
Parameter Prior mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 5th %ile 95th %ile
φR 0.5 0.8507 0.8506 0.7827 0.9034
˜ φπ = φπ − 1 0.54 0.9465 0.6649 0.2595 1.6056
φy 0.25 0.4737 0.4882 0.1047 0.8127
ρz 0.2 0.2231 0.2143 0.0727 0.3622
ρy∗ 0.9 0.9436 0.9478 0.9180 0.9698
σa 1.5 0.4387 0.4344 0.3579 0.5182
σy∗ 1.5 1.4970 1.3973 0.8759 2.1791
σ2
m 0.5 0.1665 0.1445 0.1217 0.2110
k 0.5 0.6834 0.4028 0.1289 1.2154
R 2.51 2.4902 2.1021 0.9165 4.0074
α 0.2 0.3409 0.3454 0.2528 0.4248
σ−1
c 0.5 0.6630 0.6494 0.5083 0.8189
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